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IN THE SUPREM'E COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
P,:\ CTFIC ( 1 ( ):JI P.t\X)r,
a corporation, Pl.a~n
. t ~. and A ]Jpr 11 aJl t.,
11
~() l Hf1ll1£RK

-vs.~~B~. Hl~LJ~X ~HE1~lf_._:\X _AH1~ll1'"R,

and ~r R S . GLENERA SHEEHAN
I Ir.. XTEl~~
DefeJtdaHfs and Respondents,

-vs.XICT( Cl-fOl'"l~.XOS and \VIFE,
Defendants and RespondeHfs,.
-vs.~fiLTON -4\. OniAN et al,
Defe nda Jlf."·, Respondents, and
Cross- .._4JJ }Jell (t Jl fs.

BRIJ~F

(fB.,

Ca~e

Xo.

9123

1

J)}~1~ 1 1 ~XD:\ xrr~. l~E~J>( )XD}~Xrrs.

~\XD c~ROSN-_[\

P PELL_._L\NTS

rJlhe H})pellant i~ a private intere~tatt> railroad COrporation~ operating a rail line 'Yest,Yard fro1u Ogden.
l . . tah, across or throgh a portion of the "Taters of Great
1
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Salt Lake in Box Elder Conty, Utah (Tr. 328, Ex. 1).
In the exercise of its statutory power of eminent domain
(Utah Code Annotated for 1953, Sees. ·78-34-1 to 17)
appellant condemned and took several n1illion cubic
yards (Tr. 239, 243, 344, 361-3) of sand and gravel
from the lands of respondents (Ex. 1, Tr. 1-1). It is
in1portant to note that this eminent don1ain proceeding
did not involve the usual taking by the conden1nor of
the title to the land. This \Vas a proceeding by the condemnor to enter upon the lands of the respondents for
the sole purpose of removing therefron1 the sand and
gravel and other 1naterial ·w·hich \vere contained \vithin
these lands, and to use these 1ninerals in building a ne\v
railroad bed by the appellant railroad co1npany.
The three separate cases \vhich appellant had iniated in the lower court to take the sand and gravel fro1n
the three separate O\Ynerships of land involved (Tr. 1718) were, with the consent of the parties, tried together
before a jury to deter1nine the dan1ages to be a\Yarded
each of the defendants (Tr. 7-8). Fron1 the a,,,.ards n1ade
and the judg1nent entered in the t\YO cases X os. S071
and 8191 and fron1 the denial by the lo\ver court of
appellant's 1notion for a ne\Y trial as to each of the three
cases, including Case No. 8192, appellant prosecutes this
appeal. The case involving the Sheehan sisters, Jlrs.
llunter and l\1rs. Arthur, ",.as designated in the lo\ver
court as No. 8071. The case in \Yhich Nick Chournos and
his \Yife \Yere na1ned as defendants \Yas there desi()'nated
as No. 8191. And the third case designated in the lo\ver
court as No. 8192 \Yas against niilton A. On1an, Xick
~

2
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( •hournos, Nant ( hourno:-; and each of their 'YiYe~. Thi~
third ra~P involved placer 111ining property o\\·npd by
the ~aid ~ix defendant~. The lands in eaeh of the tsvo
fir~t ahove-1nentioned ease~ \\rere patented land~ o\\·necl
h~# the respect i y·e parties.
1

-'"-\~

to the patented lands, l ase Nos. 8071 and 8191.
the lo\\·er court ~nburitted to the jury a speeial foru1 of
vPnliet requiring that it separately deter1nine the value
per eubie ~·ard, and the total value of all sand and gravel
taken hy appellant frou1 the respective land:s, and in
Pneh of those t'vo ease~ the eourt also requested th12
jury to fix the damages, if any, caused by the ~evPranee
of the use of the lands fron1 "·hich the gravel and sand
'vas re1noved, to their re1naining lands. In each of those
t\\·o ease~, the jury found a dan1age to the respective
defendants (respondents) for the quantity of sand and
gravel taken fron1 their lands, and also found that ~
~PYerance da1nage \\·as caused in each of those case~
and fixed the an1ount thereof. In each of the~e cases.
the court entered judg1nent to eonfor1n to the verdict
as soon as the verdict 'vas returned in June, 1959 as
to the value of the sand and gravel onl)·, but reserved
for so1ne tiu1e, until July 21, 1959, the entry of judgn1ent
as to the severance R\Yard.
1

_._:_\_s to the third case, the case involving the sand
and gravel plaeer 1nining clain1, designated in the lo\Yer
court as X o. 819:2, the court subn1itted a special forn1
of verdict to the jury requiring them to detern1ine the
Yalue per cubic yard and the total value of the sann
3
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and gravel re1noved therefrom as was done 1n each
of the other two cases. But no severance damage was
involved in that case and no request was 1nade by the
court that the jury make any finding relative thereto.
The jury found and determined the same value per
cubic yard of the sand and gravel taken by appellant
in this case as in each of the other two cases. Of course,
no severance damage was found by the jury in connection
with the placer mining claim case. Upon the urging of
appellant's counsel, the court withheld entry of any
judgment in this mining claim case until N" ovember 2,
1959. From the judgn1ent which the court finally entered
in this one case on November 2, 1959, the defendants
in the lo\ver court bring a cross appeal, herein contained.
But this same case is also here on appeal by Southern
Pacific Company fro1n denial by the lo\\Ter court of its
motion for a new trial.
The respondents in the lo\ver court cases X os. 8071
and 8191 agreed to a conditional order of the court that
they file notice of willingness to accept one half the
severance da1nage a\varded by the jury in each case,
plus the full a\Yard Inade on the Yalue of the gravel
and sand. The respondents filed their acceptance of this
condition, but the appellant refused to pay the judgn1ents
even on that reduced basis. The court then entered
judg1nent in each of those cases for the full jury a\vard,
both as to the value of the sand and gravel and also
as to the severance da1nage a\vard. The lo"~er court
then denied the 1notion for a ne\Y trial \Yhich the appellant filed as to each of the three cases. Fron1 that
4
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particular denial appellant prosecutes this appeal on
all three cases.
But as to the placer nun1ng case, lo\\"er court No.
81 ~):Z, it is here also by ,,,.ay of a cross-appeal from the
judgrnent \Yhich the court finally entered, in that case.
The brief of the appellants (defendants) in that case
is included under this same cover at the conclusion of
the brief for respondnets ansvvering the brief of Southern
Pacific ·Cornpany, appellant. This appeal on behalf of
the defendants belovv in the placer mining case is included here by agreement of the parties and \vith the
verbal per1nission granted by this court, to save tin1e
and expense of printing separate briefs in and pursuing
that case in a separate appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant detern1ined upon a project to replace the
trestle or bridge vvhich it had previously used in supporting its railroad trackage across Great Salt Lake
( Tr. 328). A 13-mile earth fill 'vas to be constructed
through the lake ( Tr. 286) to replace this trestle, and
it involved a great earth moving project requiring -±-+
ruillion cubic yards of sand and gravel ( Tr. 303), the
project costing $50 million (Tr. 304, 328). Only certain
types of sand and gravel could be used to properly
construct this road bed and tests vvere made and test
holes drilled in different areas b:,. appellant to locate)
and detern1ine ideally suited materials ( Tr. 290, 302,
305, 316). Location of these 1naterials \\"as also important
5
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to appellant from the standpoint of their distance fron1
place at which the great fill was to be built (Tr. 305).
Appellant looked at and tested materials at other sites
and locations, but finally determined that the area in
w11ich respondents' lands were located along the west
side of Pro1nontory ~fountain near the east end of the
proposed fill was 1nost suitable (Ex. 1, Tr. 286, 302,
303, 304, 305). The sand and gravel of respondents \vas
so ideally located with relation to the proposed project
that the loaded conveyor belts and trucks used in hauling
this material from the beds of deposit to the fill n1oved
dovvn grade with the loads (Tr. 303). Appellant actually
owned a gravel pit of its O\Yn in this area but use of
that material \vould have involved an expensive, approximately 5-mile additional truck haul of the sand
and gravel (Tr. 305, 306, Ex. 1).
It is important to note that the sand and gravel
involved in the cases herein 'vas not conde1nned until
t\vo or three years after the project concerned had
begun. It \:vas as early as 1955 that appellant \Yas negotiating for the purchase of sand and gravel for use
in this project, and it signed a contract on ..._\.ugust 15
of that year with one Del H . ..._\.danls to pay to hin1
$100,000 for up to 56 1nillion cubic yards of 1naterials
to be taken fro1n lands he O\vns "~hich are adjacent
to the lands of respondents herein (Ex. 1, Ex. 8~ Tr.
308, 314, 326, 331). Also, the respondents herein \Yere
\Vell a,,~are of this projeet by reason of an e1ninent
do1nain proceeding not involved herein \Vhieh appellant
had filed against the sa1ne Mrs. Glenera Sheehan Hun6
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ter, \\·ho i~ involved here as respondent in the lo,Yer
eourt rasp X o. 8071. That ea~P 'vas proseeuted h)· the
appellant herein for the purpose of taking by condernnation the right to construct the large conYe)·or belt
used in transporting the sand and gravel aeross the
lands of :\Irs. Hunter located in the southea8t corner
of the ~au1e St>etion :2, T. G N., R. G \Y., as is involved
in this appeal (Ex. 1, Tr. 211). >K• Appellant also had
prPviously seeured the use of an SO-acre tract in Section
11 of this to\\·nship o\\·ned b)· the respondent herein, :\I r.
Chournos, upon \\·hich to build its construction to,,·nsite
( Tr. :)20-1).
It \\·as rnore than t\vo yean-; after the date of the
said contraet \Yith ~lr. Adarns for purchase frorn hi1n
of sand and gravel ( Tr. 290, 292, 309) and after the
project had been under \vay for approxirnatel)· the sarne
period of tirnP ( Tr. 23) that eminent dornain proceedings
\\·ere begun to secure the right to take the rnaterials
fron1 the adjacent lands of respondents herein. The
Suunnons in the proceeding herein against the Sheehan
sisters, 1\irs. Hunter and 1\irs. Arthur, to take sand and
gravel frorn their lands in Section 1 and 2 of the above
to,vnship \\·as served on October 11, 1957 ( Tr. :296).
It \\·as about seven rnon.ths after that date, or on J nne
11. 195S, that the proceedings·. (designated in the lo\Yer
court as l\ os. H191 and 8192) "~ere initiated in the other
t\\TO cases involved here to take similar rnaterials fron1
the ( hournos fee lands and frorn the placer clairu ('Tr.
1

*The sumons in that case was served on June 20, 1956 and that case
is designated in the same lower court as No. 7857.
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296, 300). Test holes had been drilled upon respondents'
lands by appellant to determine the quality and amount
of suitable sand and gravel located therein ( Tr. 291) ·
The quantity of sand and gravel taken by the appellant from the parcels of lands involved herein owned
by the different respondents was stipulated by the parties at the consolidated trial of the -three cases and the
yardage involved in each of the cases \vas:
Froin the lands in Case No. 8071 ____ 1,909,449 cu. yards
From the lands in Case N' Oo 8191 ____ 2,052,698 cu. yards
From the lands in Case No. 8192 ____ 1,222,899 cu. yards
( Tr. 239-243, 344, 361-3).
There was no sho\ving that there \Yas any difference
1n the n1arket value in place of the sand and gravel
taken from respondents' lands as of the t\YO different
dates involved, October 11, 1957 and June 11, 1958. It
was stipulated that the value in each \\-as to be as of
October 22, 1957. The jury found that Yalue to be 3c
per cubic yard in each case, and the court entered judgment accordingly· in the case K os. 8071 and S191, but
reserved entry of judgn1ent in the ren1aining case (Tr.
361-3).
j
At the

tri~ne::"p~ced eight well qualified

witnesses as to the value of the sand and gravel in
place at the ti1ne of tJ1e service of sun1n1ons in these
cases. Six of these testified (Tr. 21-l-!1)and the parties
stipulated that if the remaining t\YO \Yitnesses \\'"ere called
to testify for respondents that their testin1ony \Yould
8
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be <'tunulative and substantially as had been previously
tPstified ( Tr. l-t-~-3).

A qualified professional appraiser, Charles E.
Htory, called h),. respondents testified the value per cubic
~·ard to be 3e as of October 1957, ( Tr. 30) and the sa1ne
value a~ of June 1958 (Tr. 31).
J. P. Gibbons, president of the well-kno,vn \vestern
construction firn1 of Gibbons and Reed of Salt Lake City,
a person \Vith many years experience in the use, purchase
and sale of materials of the type "'"ith \vhich ,,,.e are
involved here used in construction projects of different
types {Tr. 40-45), also fixed the damage to respondents
for the taking of their sand and .gravel herein at 5c
per cubic yard (Tr. 46). He would have paid 5c per
yard for this material had he been building this project
(Tr. 47). 11r. Douglas J. Fife, also a person engaged
for n1any years in the construction business (Tr. 64)
and the O\\'"ner of a gravel pit near Brigham City, Utah
( Tr. G-+) also testified that the average value of respondents' sand and gravel for the time involved was 5c per
cubic yard ( Tr. 68). He sells sand and gravel at his own
pit near Brighan1 Cit~,., utah, at $1.15 per cubic yard.
(Tr. 78).
The above testin1ony as to the value in place of the
sand and gravel involved \\'"as supported b~,. the testimon~,.
of t\vo additional construction co1npany OV{ners, 1Ielbourne Ford of Provo, T;tah, ( Tr. 89-115) and ~Jac-k
Parsons (Tr. 131-142).
9
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Douglas H. Bram1ner was called as a ·w·itness for
respondents in connection with the quality of the sand
and gravel which appeallant had re1noved froin respondents' pits. He is a graduate civil engineer employed
with the firm of Sumner-Margetts Company of Salt Lake
City \vhich perforn1s soil analyses work (Tr. 8:2). IIis
testi1nony \vas that sou1e of these sands and gravel were
of such high quality that they were suitable for concrete
aggregate use \vithout washing or treat1nent ( Tr. 8384), and that this sand and gravel co1npares favorably
with like n1aterial fro1n other pits (Tr. 84:).
Ti1e State of l-:-tah O\vns the Section 36 on the north
\\Tall of the canyon kno,vn as Little ,~alley adjacent on
the north to the Section 1 fro1n \vhich n1ost of the sand
and gravel herein \vas taken by appellant from respondents' lands (Ex. 1). Lee E. Young, ~Ianager and appraiser for the l~tah State Land Board in charge of
the 1nanage1nent of the lands of the State, testified that
this section \vas rocky, (Tr. 1:20) "Tith n1uch 'vaste and
that it \\'"as inaccessible ( Tr. 1:23). Yet interest in a rock
and gravel lease of this entire section "'"aS developed
in 1955 and \vas entered into \\'"ith a private party~ J.
T. [Tnder\vood of Ogden, at 1 ~~~c per cubic yard, \vith
the State charging $3:20 per 8ecti on a~ the lease fee.
or 50c per acre, in addition to the price per cubic yard
for an~,. 1naterial dug out of thi~ section, pln~ a royalt~T
to be paid back to the State ( Tr. 1:2:1). Thi~ \va~ before
appellant had built ih;; conve~,.or belt into Little \:alleY
but it \\'"HS doing the exploration \Vork at that tin1~
(Tr. 123).
10
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. . \ eon~idPrnble part of the 1naterial pnrcha8ed by
appPllant front the D~l ll. . .\da1ns lan<l~ c-ould only be
~P('Ul'Pd hy hreaking up rocky ledges ,,·ith \vorld record-size explosive eharges \vhich involved ronsiderable expen~e for appellant in the building of tunnels under the
roek and in the use of explosives ( ~rr. 3:3;)-36). X o such
expen~P \Ya~ nece~sar)'" in securing and ntoving the sand
and gravel of any of these respondents. It \vas scooped
up fro111 its natural location and loaded direetly onto
the conveyor belt (Tr. 336). It was a do,vn grade haul
fro1u the place \Yhere these 1naterials "'"ere located to the
~iteofuse (Tr.303).
It eosts eonsiderable to haul this 1nateriaL ahout ;)<·
per ton per 1nile on the higlr\;vays ( Tr. 51, 71, 110) anrl
that ele1nent 'veighed favorably in connection \vith the
taking h)'" appellant of respondents' near-by, quality
n1aterial ( Tr. 305). Appellant's own gravel pit located
on thi~ sa1ne 1nountain 'vas too far a"'"ay fro1n the plaee
of use to he acceptable to the1n ( Tr. 306).
Respondents' sand and gravel \vas available and
accessible along an old road \vhich extended through
this Little \Talley (Tr. 161). It \Vas a s1nooth, \vide canyon, not steep (Ex. 5, 6, 7, Tr. 154), the heart or center
of \vhich 'vas re1noved by the hauling out of this sand
and ·gravel ( Tr. 162), located on the san1e side of the
Pron1ontory :Jlountain as the fill ",.hich appellant \Va~
to construct (Exs. 1, 5, 6, 7) .
. .:\hove is set forth the factual state1nent relating to
the 1narket value, in place, of the sand and gravel \vhich
]1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellant removed fro1n the lands of respondents involved in each of the three cases which were tried
together. There is present here an additional element
of damage in t\vo of the cases only; that is, in the lower
court Cases, No. 8071 in which the Sheehan sisters, ~Irs.
IIunter and ~Irs. Arthur, are respondents, and in No.
8191 in which Nick Chournos et ux are the only respondents. The sand and gravel placer mining clain1 is
not involved in this additional element of damage. Belo\v
is set forth the factual statement relating to the damage
done the remaining lands of the respondents involved
in the t\\TO above-named cases, through the excaYation
by the appellant of the sand and gravel from their Little
Valley lands.
The respondents, in each of the t\YO said cases, O\Vn
thousands of acres of grazing lands of \vhich the area
from \vhich the sand and gravel "~as taken by appellant
\vas a very in1portant part (Tr. 1±5-7, 1-±S~ 15±, 17±~ 186).
Chournos has O\vned and used in his life-tn11e grazing
operation (Tr. 144) about 110,000 acres of range lands
(Tr. 145-7) a very i1nportant part of \Yhich is \vithin
and surrounding the lands upon \Yhieh appellant dug
out its vast pits. (Ex. 1. 5, 6, 7). The 1:2,000 acres O\vned
by the respondents, ~Irs. Hunter and :\Irs. Arthur. are
si1nilarly located \vith regard to these excayations (Tr.
186, Ex. 1, 5, 6, 7). The lands of these sisters haYe also
been continuously used in livestock operations for 1nany
y·ears - since 1931 to the kno\\Tledge of :Jir. Chournos
and the \\Titness 1\lr. J(eller (Tr. 169, ~~1). Prior to that
tinlP and before the death of their father, their parents
12
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had lived upon this ranch novl o'vned by the daughters
(~rr. 169). These lands were valuable in the grazing and
proteeting of sheep during the winter months (Tr. 146,
1-l-H, 15-t, 170, 191). Appellant's excavations destroyed
for all ti1ne a vital and key part of these lands (Tr.
1f)-t, 170-71, 324, 333).
Regarding this severance or consequential damage
proble1n, it is to. be noted that the lands of the respectiv'2
respondents, frou1 which appellant dug up and re1noved
the sand and gravel, constituted a part, not only of a
larger tract from which these materials were re1noved
(Ex. 1), but they were a part of a very much larger
acreage of disconnected lands owned in each instance
by the respective respondents within this same Promontor~'" ~.fountain area (Ex. 1) and were being used in
connection "Tith the unified use by the parties of all
of their said lands at the time appellant took p·ossession
under its eminent do1nain proceedings (Tr. 147, 17 4, 186,
191). As to the respondent ·Chournos, he owns considerable other acreage, in addition to his Promontory 1\Iountain lands, (Tr. 144-5) and the value of all of which
lands and the use thereof in his one unified business
"~as adversely affected (Tr. 184).
The respondent Nick Chournos has o\vned and operated his o,,~n sheep outfit in Box Elder, Cache and
Rich Counties in the northern end of Utah for the last
3G ~'"ears. In these three counties he owns \Videly separated acreages of range lands used in his single~ unified
sheep operation. He O\vns and grazes a total of 110,000
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acres of lands in these three counties, and leases approximately 23,00.0 acres from the State of Utah adjoining
his owned lands. He also grazes some public d~main
lands ( Tr. 144-5). To round out his year-long grazing
operation, his sheep are moved from one of his land
areas to another as the seasons change. He grazes during
the summer season upon hisl approximately 20,000 acres
of high elevation ranges in the Monte Cristo area of
Rich and Cache Counties (Tr. 146-7, 219). In the \Yinter
months, he 1noves his sheep to his approxi1nately 70,000
acres of ovvned range and the intermingled State lease
and public do1nain lands in \\~estern Box Elder County
near the K evada State Line ( Tr. 145-6, 219). The 20,000
acres \vhich he o\vns upon the Promontory .:Jiountain
are grazed during a part of the "'inter and for the spring
la1nbing season (Tr. 146, 185, Ex. 1).
The respondent (~hournos operates approxi1nately
6,000 e\ves, \Vhieh annually produce approxin1ately· the
san1e number of la1nbs, and all of \vhieh 12,000 head of
sheep are taken back to the said high sunnner ranges
in ~lay or June after the lan1bs are born and docked out.
Here they are all grazed until the la1nbs are sold as
111eat ani1nals about Septe1nber of each year (Tr. 1-!56-7 -8). All of the ~aid l;hournos lands are used and required to round out a year-long operation during the
different ~easons (Tr. 147-S, 176) .....\.bout :2500 of these
e\\~es are la1nbed out upon these Pron1ontory ~fountain
ranges ( Tr. 148). These lands and their use in this sheep
grazing operation eonsti tute one unified business operation (Tr. 147). Each of these different range areas sup14
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ple1nent~
hu~inP~~

the other to round out
('J1r. 1-+7).

thi~ ~Tear-long gra~1ng

l . . pon thi~ sanH· I>ro1uontory .JI ountain and adjacent
to and inter1ningled 'Yith the ·Chournos land~ in thi~
arPa, in ~ueh a 'vay that a grazing usP of the area
1nean~ a use of the lands of all, the respondent si~ter~.
~Lrs. _..:\rthur and l\l rs. Hunter, o'Yn 1:Z,OOO a ere~ of
grazing lands (Ex. 1, ~r r. 17 -+, 177, 186, 200, :Z 13, ~(i5).
~rhe Del Ji. Adan1s, heretofore referred to herein, al~o
o\\·ns about 8,000 acres of grazing land:-~ on this :-;a1ne
l)rou1ontory· ~I ot1ntain, and, though hi~ land~ are :-;uh~tantiall~T in the south end of this peninsula, the~r are
also inter1ningled soule\vhat \Yith the ll unter-.Axthur
and Chournos o'Ynership and, particularly \Yith that of
Chournos (Ex. 1, Tr. 213, :Z51, :Z65, :2()7 -:Z(i8). \Y.ith the
exception of about a thousand aeres of public do1uain
\vhich the Governinent has reserved in this area, and a
fe"T placer 1nining elain1s O\Yned by l\lr. Chournos and
other~, and one of 'vhich clai1ns is alone involved in thi~
sa1ne appeal, as heretofore explained, and except for a
gravel pit O\vned by appellant itself, (Tr. 306), the above
said 40,000 acres of land constitute the total O\Ynership
for several 1niles in all directions fro1n the gravel pit~
inYolved here (Ex. 1, 216). l\fr. Chournos alone hold:-;
the right to graze the said s1nall acreage of public do1nain
(Tr. 176-7. 186).
\\~hile

neither l\Irs. Hunter nor ~Irs. Arthur ar~
actively engaged in the livestock business, their lands
are valuable for this use and \vere leased for 1uany
YPar~ (a~ early as 1931) by the respondent ( hourno~
1
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(Tr. 169) and later by Boyd Keller (Tr. 221). For about
the last five years, they have been leased by the said
Del I--I .....~dams at an annual rental of $7,000, or approximately 50c per acre (Tr. 170, 191).
rrhe Promontory Mountain lands of Chournos and
of the Sheehan sisters, Mrs. Hunter and l\1rs. Arthur,
lie in substantial acreages on both sides of this high,
steep 1nountainous ridge or range, which projects due
southward into the north end of Great Salt Lake, in
a strip of land from about 4Y2 to 6Y2 n1iles in width,
for some 25 miles, and the south 13 mlies of ''Thich is
O\vned, \Vi th the exceptions hereto£ ore noted, by these
respondents (Ex. 1, Tr. 260, 273-4, 284) extending fro111
the lake shore on the east to the lake shore on the
west (Ex. 1).
In grazing this entire Pron1ontory )fountain land
area of respondents during the \Vinter and lambing season, it is necessary fron1 the standpoint of the need for
continuously changing feed and in the use of sno\v~
water and to 1neet the challenge of \\inter \vea ther conditions, that the sheep n1ove back and forth fron1 the
lands on one side of this n1ountain to the lands on the
other side ( Tr. 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 1G:2, 19S~ 215, ~~5,
227). This Little \,..alley or canyon fron1 "·hich appellant
took the sand and gravel fron1 respondents and fro1n
the adjacent land of others provided the only road across
this Inountain, through l\Iaple Canyon on the east side
of the ridge and down Little \Talley on its "·est side (Tr.
161, 227).
16
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Little \!" allt)y extends from the west lake shore due
east to the head of 11aple Canyon ( Tr. 158, 1G1, Exs. 5,
G, 7) through vvhich this only road extended ( Tr. 161,
'J'J7) and a low pass lay due east through Little \ralley
across the top of the Inountain which livestock did and
could use in passing back and forth from one side of the
rnountain to the other (Tr. 155, 161., 235). This Little
\Talley canyon was the biggest one on the mountain, the
finest piece of range in that area, not too steep, the
key canyon to the rest of the range (Tr. 154). It would,
alone, take care of 1200 of the 2500 ewes which Chournos
larubed in this area with their lambs. It \vould care for
these evves and lambs for 45 days in the spring (Tr.
148, 159, 160). Appellant destroyed the folage producing
capacity upon the lands within the pit for all time
(Tr. 171).
Before this pit was constructed, the sheep could feed
and graze in a natural way, not being driven, through
Little , . .alley (Tr. 161, 162, 198, 225) and either down
l\Iaple Canyon on the east side (Ex. 1, Tr. 161, 227)
or over a pass immediately south of the head of Maple
Canyon to the east shore lands (Tr. 161, 225, Ex. 1).
This passage\vay -vvas very important in making a natural
utilization of the forage types on each side of the
rnountain (Tr. 160, 162) and the only water available
for these sheep is at the mouth of Little \ 1 alley on the
\vest lake shore ( Tr. 157, 158, 162, 215). While sheep
can secure their \Yater requirements from sno,v, when
that is available to them, and Little Valley provided a
natural place at its head for this ( 158, 225), the~~ 1nust
17
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have strean1 or spring water when the snow is gone.
This dry condition is found in this area both in the fall
before snow has arrived and in the spring after it has
rnelted a\\Tay, and the mouth of Little Valley provided
this water (Tr. 157, 158, Ex. 1). Occasionally, sno\vs,
too deep for sheep to survive will fall, and in this condition, Little Valley offered a safe and gradual retreat
to lo\\Ter elevation ranges ( Tr. 156, 157, 226, 227, :2:28,
Ex. 1, 5, 6, 7).
In conditions \vhen the sno\V is too deep, it \Yill
al\\Tays be and ren1ain deeper on the east side of the
Inountain ~Tr. 231), and the \Yest side in and near Little
\~alley offers the only safe \Yinter range in these extreme
conditions ( Tr. 229). There are only 2¥2 to 3 sections
of range \\"'hich is safe for livestock in these extre1ne
\\rinter conditions in this entire range area. (Tr. 226, 231)
The forage gro\Ying along the north side of Little
\"alley \\Tould gro\v earlier in the season than that
along its south canyon \vall, \Yith differ~nt species gro\ving on different sides, ( Tr. 158, 139) all of "Thich could
be grazed as the sheep satisfied their changing needs
for forage in n1oving back and forth fro1n the \Yater
at the Inouth of Little \ 1 alley on the lake shore to the
feeds up through Little \Talley and do\Yn to different
feeds on the ea~t side of the 1nountain ( Tr. 13S~ 159,
1G2, ~25). It provided a natural salt feed for the liYe~tock so that in ~eenring this, it eli1ninated the necessity
of feeding then1 salt ( Tr. 1G:2) .
.r\ll these advantages are no\\T destroyed by the ex18
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('.UYation "·hi<·h appellant gouged frou1 tlltl "Tide bottou1
of thi~ long ran yon (Ex. 1, 5, G, 7). Tht YPry renter of
thi~ eanyon, fron1 "\Vall to canyon "\Yall, "Tas dug out b.'T
appellant ( Tr. 171, 178, Ex. 5, G, 7) in the ereation of
it~ ;~:~5-a<'re gravel pit ( Tr. 205) ''"·hich i~ t\\To 1nile~
long ( Tr. 155). 1-{euloval of the sand and gravel destroyed
thP forage gTo\\·ing on the land for all tiu1e ( 'l1 r. ~:1fi,
;~;~~~' 171). Xo 1nore can this biggest and best forageproducing canyon in the entire range ( Tr. 151) be used
a~ a grazing or as a lautbing range, because sheep cannot
and \\Till not go this long distance "Tithout feed through
this gravel pit to reach range on the different ~ide.-:
of the n1ountain ( Tr. 162, 16±, 178, 211). Thi~ only
source of fresh "·ater can no longer be used to service
livestock to utilize the \vide forage area through Little
\ ..alley and beyond as \vas done before the pit \vas dug.
The range on the east side of the 1nountain is no"\v
segregated frou1 the range on the \vest side of the Inountain ( Tr. 161, 162, 178, 211).
1

The high, perpendicular banks of this excavation are
very dangerous to the lives of sheep \vhieh n1ight try
to graze the fringe lands left in this canyon. Considerable
numbers of sheep, up to a thousand at a tin1e, have
been kno\vn to be frightened or other\\Tise caused to
plunge over banks of the kind left by appellant in thi~
pit and be killed err. 16-1-, 1G6, ~o:-3, 208, 228, 2:-30). Thj ~
condition i~ also dangerous to herders of the flock~.
particularly at night and in the slipper~~ \Y'eather of
"Tinter ( Tr. 16;)). This dangerous condition could he
corrected at a cost of $28,000.00 ( Tr. :207-8). hut even
19
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if this were done it would not correct the fact that
'
sheep would not use this area to get back and forth
from one side of the mountain to the other, because
no forage \Vill grow in these pits (Tr. 168, 170-171), and
it is too far for them to travel through the barren pits
to reach forage. (Tr. 162, 164, 178, 211)
To try to use Little Valley again with ewes and
la1nbs "\vould only result in the death of many of the
sheep by falling over the banks ( Tr. 164, 203, 208, 228,
230) and \Yould only result in the making of many "bum"
or orphan lambs "\vhich are practically \Yorthless (Tr.
163-4). And this has been an excellent lambing ground
(Tr. 159, 160, 198, 213).
Little \:alley \Yill not again be available as the passageway for livestock in utilizing the ranges on either
side of the mountain (Tr. 16:2, 164, 178, :211). The Little
\:alley canyon and the area from \vhich appellant nrined
out the sand and gravel had the sa1ne relationship to
the lands of Mrs. Arthur and }Irs. Hunter as it had to
those of l\1:r. Chournos ( Tr. 170). For all period of
ti1ne Chournos has grazed, trailed and traveled through
this Little \'alley in his liYestock operations upon all of
the lands contained therein, \vhich \\~as the san1e for
the Sheehans and their lessee operations (Tr. 177).
The re1naining lands of these respondents are less
valuable as a result of this destruction of Little \..,.alley
by appellant. The lands of ~[rs. Hunter and )[rs ...A. rthur
had been leased for an annual rental of $7~000 per year
at the tiu1e appellant took possession of then1 and began
20
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its railroad project ( rrr. 170, 191). They have been dainaged to the extent of 20% to 25% of their former value
or to the extent of 20% to 25% of $7,000 yearly (Tr.
171, 172) or to the total extent of $28,000.00 to $35,000.00
on a per1nanen t basis ( Tr. 184, 186, 188, 192, 195, 197,
206, 207), vvhich is capitalizing the annual damage on
a ~0-year basis (Tr. 173, 174, 175, 231).
The Chournos lands were damaged in an even more
serious \Yay than is the case with the Sheehan lands,
since he owns a much greater acreage than is owned by
the Sheehan sisters (Ex. 1, Tr. 144-45) and all of \\·hich
has been used for many years in one unified sheep
operation in which the Little Valley and the Promontory
I\[ountain lands contributed an important use (Tr. 146,
185). From the standp-oint of his Promontory Mountain
lands, standing apart from his other holdings, his damage \vas not less than that for Mrs. Hunter and Mrs.
Arthur ( Tr. 185-6, 195, 197, 203, 206-7).
Appellant had entered into a contract with Del H.
Adams to pay a total of $100,000 for the taking of material from the lands of Thir. Adams within this Little
\"'"alley (Tr. 314, 320, 321, 326, 332, 343), and although
the contract provided for payment at the rate of 2
1nills per yard, Thfr. Adams had been convinced that
this contract vvould provide him a pay1nent in the total
sun1 of $100,000 for the sand and gravel to be taken
fron1 his lands ( Tr. 321, 326, 343). He was also to receive
$2500 per year for the period the appellant \Yas occupying his lands \Yhile building the project, for the
21
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nuisance or inconvenience to his livestock operations ( Tr.
336, 321, 322). The jury awarded Mr. Chournos $3200
for the one year appellant similarly interfered \Yith his
operations \vhile building its project and after taking
posession of his property in addition to the $32,000
a\Yarded to him as permanent severance da1nage ( Tr.
362).- An identical per1nanent severance a\Yard "~as n1ade
in the Hunter-Arthur case (Tr. 361).
STATE!1ENT OF POINTS
POINT I. .
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WERE FREE FROM ERROR WITH RESPE<:~T TO THE VALUATION OF RESPONDENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS.
THE EVIDENCE BELOW AS TO THE VALUE OF
RESPONDENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS WAS PROPER
AND COMPETENT TO SUPPOR'T THE VERDICT OF
THE JURY.
(a)

(b) THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
THE COURT BELOW IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
OTHER SALES.
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION CONTAINED IN NOTES ON PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2 WAS
NOT PREJUDICIA.L AND ANY ERROR IN CONNE·CTION THEREWITH HAS BEEN WAIVED.
(c)

THE PROPER MEASURE OF \TALU.ATION IS THE
FAIR MARI{E'T VALUE OF THE RESPONDENTS'
GRAVEL DEPOSITS SEPARATELY EVALUATED.
(d)

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS'
22
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REI\JIAINING LANDS AND THE VERDICTS RETURNED
THEREON ARE SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT AND COl\1PETENT EVIDENCE.
(a) · THE

TESTilVIONY CLEARLY S H 0 W S THAT
THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING THE
LANDS WHI·CH WERE DESTROYED BY APPELLANT
IN EXCAVATING THE GREAT PIT FROM THE FLOOR
OF THE LITTLE VALLEY CANYON; AND APPELLANT
0 B J E C T E D TO RESPONDENTS' QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO POINT .UP CLEARLY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER LANDS.
(b) THE DAMAGES AWARDED BELOW FOR THE
DEPRECIA·TION IN THE VALUE OF THE RESPONDENTS' RElVIAINING LANDS WERE PROPER UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
(i) The Award Below for Damages to Respondents'
Remaining Lands Can Be Proper1y Sustained as Proper
"Consequential Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein.
(ii) 'The Award Below for Damages to Respondents'
Remaining Lands Can Be Sustained as Proper "Severance Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein.

THE DAMAGES AWARDED BELOW TO RESPONDENTS' REI\1AINING LANDS WERE FOR THE DEPRECIATION IN ·THE VALUE OF THOSE LANDS AND
NOT L 0 S S E S TO THE BUSINESS ·CONDUCTED
THEREON.
(c)

(d) THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS'
REMAINING LANDS WERE NOT THE RESULT OF
ADDING VALUES FOR THE DIFFERENT USES OF
TIIE LANDS TAKEN.
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD
UPON WHICH THE JURY PROPERLY BASED THEIR
FINDING OF DAMAGES ·TO RESPONDENTS' REl\1AINING LANDS.
(e)
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POINT III.
BASED ON THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD,
IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE VERDICT BELOW WAS
EXCESSIVE AND THE RESUIJT OF PASSION AND PREJUDI·CE.
POIN'T IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
PAYMENT OF THE JUDGMENT EN'TERED BELOW IN
CASE NO. 8192 TO BE HELD IN ABEYAN·CE PENDING
THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHALLENGE BY THE
UNITED STA'TES TO THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS'
MINING CLAIMS.

ARGl~~IEXT

AKD

Al~THORITIES

POINT I.
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WERE FREE FROM ERROR WITH RESPE·CT TO THE VALUATION OF RESPONDENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS.

'r

THE EVIDENCE BELOW AS TO THE ALUE OF
RESPONDENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS 'VAS PROPER
AND COMPETENT TO SUPPOR'T THE VERDICT OF
THE JURY.
(a)

Each of the four \\Titnesses (Storey~ Gibbons, Fife
and Ford) \vho ''rere called belo\Y in behalf of the respondents and \Vho expressed an opinion as to the 1narket
value in place of the graYel deposits \Yith \Yhieh \Ye are
here concerned, fixed a fair 1narket Yalne on such deposits at 5c per cubic yard ( Tr. ~9, 31, -1-G, GS, 100). The
jury· returned a Yerdict in the case of each respondent
deter1nining such value to have been 3c per cubic yard
24
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( Tr. 361-362). Three of these ''.:itnesses, Gibbons, Fife
and Ford, "\Vere then actuall~v engaged in the general
contracting and sand and gravel business and represented a cornbined experience in the Idaho-l~tah-Nevada
area in that business of nearly 65 years (Tr. -!1, G4, 90).
The only contrary evidence "\\'as that adduced fron1
the sole "\Yitness called in behalf of appellant, narnely,
l\Ir. Bagley, the project-engineer for J\!Iorrison-Knudson
Cornpany, the very company having the ocntract for
the construction of the project here involved and for
"\vhom appellant condemned respondents' gravel deposits
( Tr. 290, 292), ''"' ho prior to his employ1nen t by l\Iorrisonl(nudson purchased fill material upon only one prior
occasion ( Tr. 293). His estimate as to the market value
of respondents' deposits was two mills per cubic yard
(Tr. 300), or nearly 1/25 of the value fixed by Mr.
Storey, ~Ir. Gibbons, Mr. Fife and Mr. Ford.
In addition to the opinions expressed to the jury
by respondents' expert witnesses, respondents presented
to the jury evidence of other comparable sales of fill
rnaterial. Defendants' Exhibit 2 reflected the price paid
per ton and per cubic yard by Gibbons & Reed Construction Company for gravel deposits belonging to
third parties (Tr. 61) from the year 1953 to 1959, and
sho"\Yed a range of 2c per ton to 6c per ton. On the
converted basis of cubic yards (1 enbic yard of gravel
is a pproxirnately 3,000 pounds, or 11j2 tons) ( Tr. 59),
this price range "\vould then be fron1 approximately
3c per cubic yard to as high as 9c per cubic yard. This
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exhibit further Teflected sales fron1 remote pit areas
near Wells, Carlin, and Ely, Nevada, and Dunsmui~,
California at a price of 3-1/3 cents per ton, or approxrnlately 4.9c per cubic yard.
Witness lTord further testified that fill purchased
near Soda Springs, Idaho, an area as ren1otely situated
as Prornontory (Tr. 98, 100) \vas 5c per ton or an Bequivalent to about six or seven cents a yard." (Tr. 109)
Witness Parsons ranged his prices from 1%c to Sc
( Tr. 137, 138) per cubic yard for gravel purchased frorn
undeveloped areas ( Tr. 1-11) in X orthern and \\~estern
1Ttah (Tr. 137).
It \Yas sho\vn that the State of Ltah leased undeveloped gravel pits even in ren1ote areas for frorn 1 %c
to 5c per eubic yard (Tr .. 1:2±) and leased gravel in
Section 36, a desolate and inaccessible area on Prornontory for 1lj2 c per cubic yard prior to the construction
activity in that area ( Tr. 123).
\\Titness Brannner, called in behalf of re~pondent~~
testified that, as a result of an anayl~is perforrned
upon sarnples of re~pondents~ graveL it \Yas hi~ opinion
that said gravel \YH8 ~uitable for concrete aggregatr
and cornpared favorabl~~ "Tith gravel taken fron1 developed pit area~ in the Salt Lake \Talley ( 1.,r. 88. S-1-).
De~pite

the over\Yhehning evidence of record to support a vPrdiet of 3e per cubic yard for re~pondent~,
gravPl deposit~, appellant no\Y insists that the only
cornpetent Pvidence of value "-as that offered by the
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Halaried

eu1plo~·ee

o.f

~lorrison-l(nnd~on. (\nnpan~·,

Jlr.

l3agle~·,

to "·it: ~/lOth eE·nt~ per cubic yard. It i~ di~
('PrnihlP fro1n the tone of appellant'~ ('l'O~~ exruninatioa
and appellant'~ brief that appellant'~ position is based
upon the thPor~~ that inas1nuch as there \\·a~ no read)·
1narket for respondents' 1naterial~ in October of 1957
and ,.J nne of 1D;),~, the valuation placed thereon i~ based
upon future, re1note and speculative uses.
T'hi~

case presL~nts a soule\\·hat curious and unu~ual
situation. \Y e are here involved ,,·ith a co1n1nodity,
~nitable and adaptable, both in qualit)· and quantit~·, for
concrete aggregate, fill purposes, roadbed eoncrete, anrl
all the n1any uses to \vhich gravel frou1 ahnost an)·
source in this State or else\vhere n1a-y be put (Tr. 4D,
73, 83, 93, 13±). It is contended, how·ever, hy appellant
that this conunodity \Vas valueless because situated in
a ren1ote area and far fro1n ''1narket," the haulage cost
thereof 1naking its eonnnercial use econo1nicall)· infeasible. ( Testin1on)· \vas elicited to sho\v the prohibitive
rate of shipping this n1aterial to Brighan1 City ( Tr. 71).)
This argtunent overlooks a fact that beco1nes apparent upon reading the record as a ''"·hole. That fact
i~ that gravel deposits seen1 to fall into t\vo rather
distinet ea tegories ( Tr. 142). The first are those clepo~i ts
in established developed gravel pits elose to centers uf
'"1narket." Gravel situated thusly can de1nand a price
of up\vards of 95c per ton ( rrr. 71) or, on a converted
price, $1.371/2 per cubic yard. The second are those deposits \vhich lie in their undeveloped state, situated in
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ren1ote places far from "market'' centers and which
achieve commercial importance because of their availability for a particular project which has come into existence in the vicinity (Tr. 133, 139, 140, 141, 142, 65 ).
Gravel deposits so situated have dem~nded any\vhere
from ly2 c to Sc per cubic yard, as illustrated above,
albeit that at the completion of the project the pit that
has been opened by the contractor may be dormant
for commercial purposes for a period thereafter (Tr.
62). An in1mediate present market and demand for
gravel in the latter category nevertheless exists, ho"\vever brief, when a project comes into existence; and a
fair price range for such gravel l1as been established
in the market therefor.
It is clear, of course, that the gravel deposits 'vith
which we are here concerned, fall "~ithin the second
category above indicated. This is, of course, "\vhat 'vas
intended by }fr. Gibbons "~hen he testified in reply to
appellant's cross examination that he \Yould pay 5r a
cubic ~~ard if he had the contract to construct the project
for appellant~ that is, by reason of the nature of the
gravel deposit in the instant ease. the fair Yalue thereof
as an undeveloped deposit aYailable~ accessible and
adaptable to use in a project "\Yhieh has ''co1ne into being"
in the iunnediate vicinit~T is 3e per cubic. yard. This
also, it is sub1nitted, is the fair intendnH?nt of the testilllon.v of the other three "~itnesst--.s called by respondents
"\vho fixed a Inarket value upon respondents~ properties.
Appellant contends, ho,vever, that in fixing the Yalue
28
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of re~podent~' gravel, \\'e n1ust ignore the ""111arket" or
dentand ereated b~, the project in existence in the vicinity, sinee this is the very project for '''lrich respondents'
deposits are sought in these conden1nation proceedings.
It 1uay be adntitted that this is the rule in some jurisdietions of this country. The rule, ho,vever, to which
the courts of this state are no\Y conunitted is that any
fact in existence on the date as of \vhich co1npensation
is to be deter1nined * \Yhich \Yould influence the value of
the property to be taken, includin,r; the existence of
the public project involved, may be properly considered
in ascertaining that value. ~Phis Court in the very recent
case of Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Ward, e!
al., ______ Utah 2d ______ , 347 P. 2d 862, 863 (1Ttah 1959)
in replying to the contention that the value of the
property taken is to be ascertained without regard to
the fact that the condemnor has entered the market
stated as follovvs:
BThe plaintiff urges the view adopted by
so1ne courts that the value of the property for
condemnation purposes should be detern1ined
\Yithout consideration for the fact that the condemnor has entered the market and plans improvements. The argun1ent supporting such rule
appears to be that the condemnee should not be
allo\Yred an advantage from the fact that the conden1nor is improving the area and the latter be
required to pay a higher price and thus in effect
suffer a penalty because of its O\Yn improvements.
>~:Summons

in each case was served approximately 10 days prior
to actual occupancy, which latter date \vas adopted by the court,
upon the stipulation of counsel, as the date as of ·which compensation was to be determined (Tr. 27).
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The contrary vie\V is that erninent domain statutes are designed only to give the condemnor
the power to purchase property "Thether the condemnee desires to sell or not, but are not purposed
to give the condemnor a~y superior ba:gaining
position as to price. vV e are in accord With what
appears to be the better vie,v, adopted by the
trial court that the condernnee is entitled to the
' value of his property at the tin1e
fair rnarket
of the service of sum1nons in the condemnation
proceedings as provided by statute; and that all
factors bearing upon such value that any prudent purchaser \vould take into account at that
time should be given consideration ... " (Emphasis supplied.)
The \Yisdonl of this rule is den1onstrated Yividly
\Yhen vie\V in the light of the circun1stances of the instant case. It is conceded that it is not the policy of
the la\\· to require a conden1nor to pay Hhold up .. prices
for properties "'needed" for the public project involved;
~Tet, neither is it the policy of the la\\T to sacrifice the
rights of the individual to the extent that the lando\vner
1nust sell less than the ··going rate~' sin1ply because the
purehaser i~ the conden1nor. Rather it is the policy of
the la\v to place both conden1nor and lando\vner in
the position of t hP hypothetical \Yilling buyer and \\Tilling seller, neither acting under co1npulsion.
rrhe eviden('p is clear and over\\Thehning that the
value of respondents~ gTHYPl deposit in an undeveloped
state, situated as it i8~ in a re1note area, but aYailable,
adaptable, aeeessihle and desirable for n8e in an existing
project ( Tr. 30:2, 305) in the vicinity \\Tas 3e per cubic
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~·ard.

rrhe eonelusion is ineseapahle in vie\\·ing their
tPstinH>ny a~ a "·hole that each of th~ contractor~ called
h)~ respondents belo,,· \Yould have paid that au1ount a~
a fair 1narket prieP if any one of theu1 \YPre engaged
in the construction of a ~i1nilar project in the area. ThP
jury has deter1nined that the price that one \\'ho \Yould
"·illingl~· pay one \Yho \vould \villingly ~ell \vas 3c per
euhie yard.

By \\·hat 1nanner of logir can \Ye no\\· say that a ppellant should not be required to pay the sa1ne price
that an~· other person \vould be required to pay for
respondents' property under the san1e circun1stane~~ ~
It is funda1nental that appellant is entitled to no 1norP
advantageous consideration, nor no less, than any other
person 1nerely because it is the conde1nnor. The fact
that the legislature has conferred upon appellant the
po\ver of e1ninent do1nain does not relieve it of the
obligation to pay that au1ount \\·hich another, not so
favorably endo\\·ed h:· statute, \Yould be \Yilling to pa~\·
if engaged in the construction of a si1nilar project in
the sa1ne vicinity. This, then, n1ust be the test of 1narket
value in this or any other land da1nage case : That
an1ount "·hich a \Villing buyer \vould pay and for \vhich
a \villing seller \\·ould sell respondents' gravel under the
circtnnstances as they existed in October of 1957 and
J nnP of 1958. If by definition, under the cii'C'lnnstance~
of this ease, a ·',Y'illing buyer" is one engaged in the
construction of a project in the neighborhood, appellant
~hould not be heard to co1nplain, since it is placed in
the ~an1e position as any other H\villinp; buyer" on
::,1
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those dates and under those circumstances, no more '
no less.
It is sub1nitted, therefore, that the value placed on
respondents' materials by respondents' witnesses is neither a fut ... re nor speculative one, but based upon a fair
price that a purchaser would be willing to pay under
all the circumstances existing as of the valuation dates
referred to.
(b) THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
THE COURT BELOW IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
OTHER SALES.

Appellant urges that prejudicial error \Yas committed by the trial court in allowing testin1ony and
evidence of other sales to be presented to the jury by
~fr. Gibbons and ~Ir. Ford. )!r. Gibbons testified regarding purchases made by his con1pany as reflected
upon Exhibit 2 (Tr. 58, 59) and indicated that these
were purchases made fro1n third parties or supplied
by the O\Yner during the period covered ( Tr. 61). The
Exhibit itself reflects, inter alia, the o\vner~ the location
and nan1e of the project inYolYed and the year of removal. Gibbons' testin1ony indicates that in each instance,
the purchase \Yas 1nade for the specific project and no
subsequent purchase n1ade after co1npletion fron1 the
particular source involved ( Tr. 61, 6:2).
l\lr. Ford testified regarding a specific purchase
1nade at Soda Springs, Idaho, in Septe1nber of the Year
195-1- (Tr. 98), fro1n an area that as in the ins.tant
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ea~e,

\vas re1notely situated ( Tr. 100) and in ··which, a8
in the instant case, the gravel deposit lie in an undevelopPd state requiring a pit to be opened by the purchaser
(Tr. 98, 99).
As to \vhere the Court is to dra\v the line in vie,,~
of the peculiar nature and situation of the coininodity
taken in this case involves practical considerations,
vveighing in the balance the possible degree of dissimilarity and confusion of issues as against the assistance
this evidence furnishes the jury in arriving at a fair
value to be paid. As stated in 5 Nichols on E1ninent
Do1nain, ( 3rd Ed.), 275 §21.3:
"The question whether such evidence shall be
adn1itted does not depend upon any fundamental
principle of the la\v of evidence, but is a purely
practical one, depending upon whether there is
a net gain or loss to the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice in land damage cases
by the use of such evidence."
It is significant that appellant's counsel sought
belo\v to restrict such evidence only to sales occurring
precisely at the "promontory area" (Tr. 57). Such a-.
vie\v under the circumstances of this case vvould be unreal and unduly harsh and unfair on respondents. As
stated in 5 Nichols, id., §21.3, and quoted \vith approval
in State r. Peek) 1 1~tah 2d. 263, 265 P. 2d 630, 637:
"It is evident that there may be considerable
difference in the size, shape, situation and imn1ediate surroundings of tV\ro estates, and perhaps
in other respects, and yet the price \vhich one
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brought 1nay be of substantial assis.tance In determining the value of the other."
Again at 5 Nichols, id. 280-281, §21.31:
"Similarity does not mean identical, but h~v
ing a resen1blance. Obviously, no t\VO properties
can be exactly alike, and no general rule c~n be
laid down regarding the degree of similarity that
must exist to make such evidence admissable.
It must necessarily vary with the circumstances
of each particular case. Whether the properties
are sufficiently similar to have some bearing on
the value under consideration, and to be of any
aid to the jury, 1nust necessarily rest largely in
the sound discretion of the trial court, which will
not be interfered \Yith unless abused. The exa,ct
lim~ts,

either of si1nilarity or difference, or of
nearness or remoteness in point of thne, is d-i_f.ficu.Zt, if not i1npossible, to prescribe by any arbitrary rule, but nzust to a large e:rtent depend on
tlze location and the character of the property
and the circunzstances of the case. It is to be
considered 1rith reference to tlze light tlzTo,zcn o·n
the issue, and not as a nzere rnetlzod of ra·i:siLng
a 1ega 1 puzzle.·· ( En1phasis supplied.)

Our Supreu1e 'Court in State r. Peele supra. has stated:
Hllo·w·ever, to be adn1issable there must be a
si1nilari ty bet\\~een the t\\~o properties, even
though they do not have to be identical in size
or shape or pos8ible use8, but there n1ust be
~ufficient 8iinila rity in these respects and in
proxi1nit~~ in tin1e of sale and the location of
the propertie8 to satisfy the trial fudge that such
erideucc 1cill be helpful to the fury i·n detet·Jnini.ng
the value of the property Pn questio·n. This is a
prelin1inar~~ question for the trial judge to de34
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terlltinP before ~ueh eYidPIH'P i~ aduti~~ahle, and
his deterutination should be follo,ved by the appellate eourt in the absence of an abuse of discretion." (En1phasis supplied.)
It i~ ~uhutittPd that under the cirelllll~tanees of thi~
<·n~P the as~istanee giYen to the jury in fixing the value
of respondents' gravel by the evidence addueed of other
sales 'vas inestin1able and that the adutission of the sau1e
"·a~ in the sound exereise of the trial eourt's diseretion.
ADMISSION OF CER'TAIN INFORMATION CONTAINED IN NOTES ON PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2 WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL AND ANY ERROR IN CONNE·CTION THEREWITH HAS BEEN WAIVED.
(c)

In eonnection 'vith Exhibit :2, appellant assign:--:
the faet that said Exhibit contains t'Yo HN ote~'' at tluJ
bottou1 thereof a~ an additional reason for the alleged
objectionable nature of the l~xhibit (See pages 21, :2:2
of Appellant's brief).
It is significant to note that appellant's eounsrl
helo"? objected to the Exhibit as a \vhole and for the
express reason that it referred to sales of gravel not
ulocated on l)rOlllOntory." (Tr. 57) At no tiule did he
direct the attention of the court to the particular portion
of the Exhibit \Yhich appellant no\\'" con1plains of: and
it is subn1itted that he 1uay not no\v raise this particular
objection for the first tin1e on appeal.
~[oreoYel',

in vie\v of the co1npelling and over\vhehning co1npetent evidence establishing value \vhich the jury
had before it. any error of the court in failing to strike
fron1 Exhibit ~ the t\vo HX otes" referred to1 if error
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there be, was harmless. It is submitted that it cannot
be seriously contended that there was a reasonable likelihood of a different result below, had the "Notes" been
stricken.
It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that
'v~1ere there is abundant competent evidence to establish
the fact sought to be proved, admission of improper
evidence does not constitute prejudicial error. Rule 61,
U.R.C.P.; Baird v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 49 L"tah 58,
162 Pac. 79, 83.
(d) THE PROPER MEASURE OF VALUATION IS THE
FAIR MARKEIT VALUE OF THE RESPONDENTS'
GRAVEL DEPOSITS SEPARATELY EVALUATED.

Inasmuch as the valuation fixed below \Yas upon the
basis of a fixed price per unit of the gra-\el deposits
here involved, and not the fair n1arket Yalue of the land
in \\Thich these gravel deposits \Yere situate, respondents
feel it is· encun1bent upon then1 to Yery briefly indicate
to the court that the rneasure adopted \Yas the proper
measure.
Although appellant has not raised any issue in this
connection, but indeed furnished testi1nony as to Yaluation also on a fixed price per unit (2/lOc per cubic yard),
in light of the recent decision of this court in the case
of State of Utah l'. v/ able, 6 lTtah :2d 40~ 305 P.:2d 495, it
is felt that it should be den1onstrated to the court that
the instant case falls "Tithin a \\Tell recognized exception
to the general principles laid do,Yn in the Noble case.
In the Noble ease this court 'Yas of the opinion that
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the evidence in the record as to valuation ,,·a~ based
upon a eo1nputation of the a1nount of gravel and rock
1nultiplied by the net profit that could be derived fron1
the 1narketing thereof. This court there held that such
evidence \\·as not con1petent because although the quality,
quantity, and extent of the gravel deposit situate upon
the land sought to be condemned was an element to be
eonsidered in assessing the rnarket value of the land,
it \Ya~ not the yardstick thereof. In the instant casP,
unlike the Noble case, the mineral deposit itself vvas
actually the subject of the condemnation rather than
the lands in \Yhich the minerals are situate. The 1neasure
of value to be applied must of necessity, therefore, be
a different one. It 'vas, therefore, proper in the instant
case to separately evaluate the gravel deposit.

± Nichols Eminent Do1nain, id., 244, § 13.22 states
the general rule announced in theN oble case as follo":s:
"However, vvhile the profits, price or value
of the n1inerals, taken separately, may not be considered, yet the value, extent and quality of such
n1inerals as exist upon the land 1nay be considered."
Xichols goes on to state that there is a \Yell recognized
exception to this general rule ( 2-tG, § 13.22 [1]) :
HThe second exception to the general rule i~
applied \Yhere the 1nineral deposit itself is the
subject of the condemnation. In such case the
deposit is treated as so 1nuch 1nerchandise rather
than land. The rule applicable to personal property is invoked and the conden1nor is liable for
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the 1narket value of the mineral deposit as separately evaluated."
The same rule was applied in the K e\V ~Iexico case,
The Board of Cuunty Cornrnissioners v. Good, 4-± N.NL
495, 105 P. 2d 470, in which condemnation proceedings
were insti t~-: ted seeking to conden1n certain lands belonging to Good for the purpose of securing rock, sand, gravel
and caliche for use upon a public high,vay. The trial
court submitted to the jury the acreage value of the land
taken, whereas Good clai1ned that he ''Tas entitled to sho-w
the n1arket value of the 1ninerals. taken as separately
evaluated. The Supren1e Court of X ew J!exico held that
this action of the trial court \vas error and reversed the
case ·w·ith instructions stating as follo,vs:
"Appellant had the right to have the jury hear
the evidence and detern1ine the actual 1narket
value of the caliche rock taken fron1 his land "ithout reference to the value of the land itself ***.
''It 1nay be doubted 'vhether appellant offered
to produce very satisfactory proof as to such Inarket value, as distinguished fron1 the Yalue of the
land itself, but that "\vould be a question for the
jury. It "\vould go to the ''"'"eight and not to the
adn1issibility of the evidence."
~rhe rulP

is si1nilarly stated in the annotation contained at 156 .:\.L.R. 1419, "·herein it is stated:
"Certainli1nitations of this general rule follo'v
directly fro1n the sta te1nent of the rule itself.
YVhere the eonde1nna tion proceeding is concerned
"·ith a use of the land "'"hich leaves the 1uineral
deposits untouched or "·here, on the other hand
onl)· the 1ninerals are taken and the land re 1nain~
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in the O\vner'~ pos~e~~ion, the general rule \vill
a ppa rentl~· heconH• inapplicable.,.
l t i~. therefore, ~nl11nitted, "·ithout cli~pute hy appellant, that inn~tuuch a~ appellant sought her·e not to condeinn the land itself, but rather a right of "Tay for the
purpo~P of extracting respondents' graYel deposit, that
the trial court belo\Y applied the proper IneaHure of Ynhu.}
in thi~ C'a~e. that i~, the gravel deposit separately evaluated.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBl\:IITTED TO THE
JURY 'THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS'
RElVIAINING LANDS AND THE VERDICTS RETURNED
THEREON ARE SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT AND COlVIPETENT EVIDENCE.
THE ·TESTIMONY CLEARLY S H 0 W S THAT
THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING THE
LANDS WHI·CH WERE DESTROYED BY APPELLANT
IN EXCAVATING THE GREAT PIT FROl\1 THE FLOOR
OF THE LITTLE VALLEY CANYON; AND APPELLANT
0 B J E C T E D TO RESPONDENTS' QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO POINT UP CLEARLY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER LANDS.
(a)

The only question presented by appellant under thi~
subdivision of its brief is \Yhether '"respondents failed
to produce co1npetent evidence that other sinrilar land~
\Yere unavailable."
. .~ppellant urges the court to Tecognize that the
Chournos lands conden1ned h~T appellant ''"·hich are involved in the severance R\\Tard case (lo\Yer court K o. 8191)
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were, at the time of suit, isolated by distances up to six
miles from his other grazing lands on Promontory by
property of others. The facts are otherwise. In its brief,
appellant refers to "the 40-acre tract taken for gravel in
the Chournos case." In this particular case, there was a
total of 200 acres of land area involved in appellant's taking, 160 acres of which land are in Section 13, which is
south of Little Valley, and with which parcel we were not
directly concerned in the severance a\vard problems. Th8
other 40-acre tract was located in Little \ 1 alley and \vas
part of an 80-acre tract owned by respondents. The
sand and gravel condemned and taken by appellant here
\Yas from the NWl!tSE 1ft of Section 6, T. 6 X., R. 5 \V.,
SLM. The facts are and the evidence clearly- sho\ved that
Chournos also o\vned, at all times herein, the immediate
contiguous parcel, the NE 1ft SE 1ft of the sa1ne section
(Ex. 1), making up the 80-acre tract.
An exan1ination of Exhibit 1 sho\YS the o\vnership
of the lands \Yithin the entire area involYed ( Tr. 1-±, 16,
17, 18, 19). That 1nap sho\vs that the SO-acre tract (X%
SE 1ft of Section 6, above to\vnship) is contiguous along
its entire south boundary for one-half 1nile to public dolnain \\Thich extends due south for one and one-quarter
miles and that this public do1nain area extends also into
the \\Test half of this Section 7 \\Thich is directly south of
the said Section 6. The testin1on:~ also sho\YS \Yithout
COTitradietion that 1\Jr. (;hournOS is the onl~T perSOll qualified and JH\riuitted to graze these public lands (Tr. 17677, 1S6). The said 1nap exhibit also sho\\Ts that the above
80-aere tract corners upon lands O\vned b:T respondent
40
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Chournos along the south tier of forties in the adjacent
section 5. And this is contiguous to approxirnately 5,000
acres of Chournos-owned lands located in the upper part
of Little \Talley and in the eastern and southern part of
the Prornontory Mountain. Every part of this acreage
is contiguous to Chournos-owned lands. If no rights exist
in Chournos (and such a concession was never made) to
trail across the Adams lands located in the Section 5
directly east of the above said Section 6 (and the evidence
is othervvise, Tr. 177, Ex. 1), it is clearly shovvn upon this
1nap that a wide open and unobstructed vvay is available
to Chournos to reach all of these lands from his said SOacre tract in the said Section 6 by going across the public
domain to the south for any distance up to a mile and R
half and then easterly into several thousand acres of his
paten ted lands.
As the said Exhibit n1ap indicates, it is necessary for
l\Ir. Chournos in moving from the the above 5,000 acre
area of his lands to cross only tvvo corners of sections
of lands ovvned by Mrs. Arthur and 1\tfrs. Hunter in reaching his additional 15,000 acres of lands located upon this
one Prornontory :\fountain Unit of his range. It must
readily be admitted that the 40 acres fron1 vvhich the sand
and gravel \Vere removed in Little \Talley is not contiguous to every other parcel of the Chournos holdings on
Promontory. Respondents never contended such to be
the case, and such need not be the situation in order to
support a severance award. This element is treated in
another division of this brief.
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The testin1onv and evidence in this case 'vas plainly
that Little \ . . alleY., served as the trail-,vay, the only road,
the frequently u~ed and natural liYestock passage,Yay hetw·een the lands on the east and those on the """e:st side of
the 1nountain ( Tr. 137, 13S, 159, 1G1, 162, 198, :21:2, :2:23,
227), as 'vell as the biggest, best and 1nore excellent lainhing range on the 1uountain (Tr. 148, 15-l-, 159, 160),_the
route to the only live 'vater in this area 'vhere these sheep
can drink in the dry fall and spring of the year 'Yhenever
sno'Y is not aYailahle to n1eet this livestock need (Tr. 157,
15S, 162, :215). It provided the easy, natural and convenient ""ay for sheep to retreat to the safe ·w·inter range
'vhen caught in the higher elevations by too deep ~no\YS
Cfr. 156, 157, 226, 2~7, :228). It """as the safe and indispensable link for livestock operations: holding the east
side and the ,,~est side ranges together as one unified
parcel of grazing lands (Ex. 1, Tr. 161, 162, 178, 211).
rrhe evidence i~ abundant and convincing to the effect
that all of the above n~e~ and purpo:'e:' to 'Yhich LittlP
\""alley had heen put and \Yhich it had ~erved before the
gaping hole 'Ya~ excavated, fron1 'Yall to ""all of the canyon and for t'Yo 111ile~ in length, 'Yere destroyed for all
ti1ne b~. tlH~ appellant'~ ~and and gravel re1noval (Tr. 1G:2-l-, 171, J~~x. 5, (). 7). X ot only "~n~ that area and its nses and
J'Plati onshi p~ to the reu1aining lands of the:'e re~pondent~
destro~"ed hut a ne"" ele1nent, never before present. \ra~
injPeted into this range area: a Yery ~erion~ and unnatural ha/.ard "~a~ created and left by the appellant in
thi~ oneP YPr~. ~afp and u~able piece of range ( T,r. G-1:-G).
rrhi~ ]1<1/.Hl'Q j~ in the e:xtre1nely high~ Unstable and per42
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l_)(-_\ndieular 'valls left around the ::335-acre pit ( rrr. ~03, l·:x.
3, 6, 7, 166). \\Thile this dangerous hazard rnay be eliininated by sloping down these high and steep bank~, the cost
thereof will approxin1ate $28,000.00, and even \vith this
done, the range will remain forever \Yithout vegetation
and will ren1ain destroyed so far as any of the above
uses and purposes are concerned ( Tr. 168, 171, 207, 208).
And the elilnination of this hazard \vhich never existed
before \\'Ould not alleviate the severance da1nage \vhich
appellant created (Tr. 161-66, 170-1).
The phy8ical s~tuation as it exists \\Tith this high
rocky 1nountain ridge dividing the east side and the ,,·e~t
8ide lands, \vith no other roads and no other usahle passes
to supply the 1neans for livestock to 1nove het\\·een th0
t'vo, precludes the possibility, fro1n the physical standpoint of securing other lands to supply the uses and purposes in connection \vith the eontinued use of the relnaining lands, \vhich the lands appellant destroyed onee
served. Ex. 1, 5, 6, 7, Tr. 15±, 155, lGl, lG-±, 171, 178, ~11,
3:Z(), 333). It is sub1nitted that, in this situation, \vherA
the identical location of the land destroyed by the coindenor is the only location \vhich a tract of land could
occup~· to 1neet the require1nents of the ren1aining lands
of the defendant, the rule requiring proof that si1nilar
lands are unavailable is satified, or is not applicable.
_._-\ny other land \vhich 1night possibly serve the uses
and purposes \vhich the land appellant destro~·p(l had
served \vould have to contain "·ater for livestock to 1neet
the needs of the \Vater \vhich the lake shore had furnished
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for livestock use to enable them to reach the available
forage from this water hole. The evidence sho\ved that
there was no other water hole in this entire area to servic.e
these particular forage lands. Lands re1noved by any
substantial distance from this area, \vithout regard to
hovv much water they 1night possibly contain, could not
service this once important segment of range. l-; nder this
situation, the ans\Yer to the question \Yhether substitute
range is -available to satisfy all of the uses and relationships \Yhich the lands destroyed once served is already
obvious.
Sand and gravel fron1 other lands or land areas
111ight be available to replace that \vhich \Yas re1noved,
and soil might conceivably be hauled in to fill up this huge
pit in Little \-;alley to provide the needed fertile top-soil
to support plant growth again. This is the only n1ethod
by '"·hich other lands might be used to substitute for the
lands destroyed. But this is un\vorthy of consideration
not only because the cost of this replacen1ent "Tould be
iH11neasurably beyond any an1ounts \rith "Thich W"e are
involved here, but years " . . ould be required to acco1nplish
this ilnpractical restoration of the ruined lands.

rr hP

land area of the re~pondents had
eonstituted one ~ingle, efficient and har1noniou~ly ftuv_·tioning \\'intPr g;razing; and ~heep lainbino· rano-e before
the connecting lands "Thich ~eryc~d to co1nbine the east and
tht~ \\'Pst ~idP of tlH' Inounta in \rere destroyed by appellant. But, h~· this dPstruetion of .Little ·\'"alle~T, for all
·
l n·aetieal l>lll'}>O~<'~, the~e land <'11' <....~t.~ a.1·o P1lYSicall~T
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per1nanently divided and separated one fron1 the other
so far as the livestock operations are concerned. The
lands had been put to this use and to no other for many
years. The fact that the tvvo land areas on either side
of the 1nountain could be held together only by land parcels in the location of those \vhich appellant destroyed
\\Tould see1n to clearly furnish all the proof required
that substitute lands could not be available in this situation.
i\ppellant neither requested an instruction to be
given by the court to the jury relating to the availability
or the unavailability of other lands, nor did it take any
exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury
on this point.
At one point in the trial where respondent endeavored to sun1marize the shovving that there \\Tas no other
available land \vhich rnight be secured to replace the parcels destroyed in Little \Talley the appellant interfereJ
\Yith and objected to that testimony (Tr. 17~). He, therefore, may not be heard to co1nplain that such factual information \vas not further developed. This court has recently ruled on this point in Weber Basin Water Causercaney District v. Braegger, (No. 8835) as follo\vs:
"The claim that the court's instructions as to
severance damages \vas inadequate in its failure
to include a proviso that defendants were disentitled to such da1nages unless there was evidence
sho,ving non-availability of cornparable land in the
area, is ansvvered by plaintiff's successful objection to the introduction of such evidence, placing
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plaintiff in no position to co1nplain that the instruction 'vas not given.''
(b) THE DAlVIAGES AWARDED BELOW FOR THE
DEPRECIA·TION IN THE VALUE OF THE RESPONDENTS' REMAINING LANDS WERE PROPER UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE
OF U'TAH.

_._L\ppellant attacks the a\\Tard belo'Y of da1nage~ forth~
depreciation in value of the respondents' re1naining lands
upon the theory that such da1nage~ resulted fron1 appellant'~ operations upon lands not o'Yned by respondent~
and further, upon the theory that, in any event. such
da1nages 'Yere not proper severance da1nages under tht>
statutes and decisions of this State.
The fallacy of this contention ""ill be 1nade apparent
by de1nonstrating that the a\\-ards n1ade belo"- for danlages to respondents' re1naining lands are properly sustainable ""hether Yiew,.ed as so-called ~'consequential dan1ages" or as H~eYerance da1nages. ~~
Before proceeding to ~o de1nonstrate~ ho\\-ever~ a
definition of ter111s~ for the sake of clarity~ appears to be
in order. In eYery conden1nation proceeding "-herein
da1nages to lands other than those taken are inYolYe(l.
t\YO situations 111ay conceiYably arise: ( 1) That situation
\\?hPrP part of a trart of land is physically appropriated.
and ( ~) ~rhat situation \\"here fro1u public 'Yorks on lands
o I' others dan1agt>s aecrue to a tract of land no part of
\\?hi<'h is ~ken. ~- Ni<'hols on l~Ininent Do1nain~ (3rd Ed.).
§ 14.1. r~,or the sa kP of convenience~ those da111agps accrulng 111 ~ihtntion. (l) "·ill he referred to in thi~ brief a~
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H~everance

da1nages '' and those dau1ages accruing 1n
situation ( :2) \vill be referred to in this brief as Hconsequential dan1ages." See 2 Kichols, id., § 6.4432.
'l"'here is an i1nportant distinction bet\veen ""severance
dan1ages" and "consequential damages," as those terms
are used herein, which must be constantly borne in mind,
because, as will be dernonstrated hereafter, the concept of
'~severance da1nages" is rnuch 1hore liberal than the concept of "'consequential cla1nages." In the case of ~'conse
(luential darnages," the o\vner, in order to l'P('over, 1nust
sho\v· that the consequential injury to his lands is peculiar
to his lands and not of a type suffered hy the puhlie as a
\Vhole. 4 Nichols, id., §1-1-.1; S(lockdale z·. Denrrr & ltirJ
Grande vVestern llail1ra.u Co., :2~ l ,.tah 201, 77 Pac. 8-±9.
Whereas, in the case of "severance da1nages," the O\\Tner
is not required to sho\Y the injury to he peculiar to his
land, on the theory that the ""just cornpensation" guaranteed by the constitution refers to the injury or loss to the
,,·hole tract caused by taking fron1 it that part that is the
subject of the conde1nnation. -l: N"ichols, id., § 1-1-.:Zl.
1

The Award Below for Damages to Respondents'
Remaining Lands Can Be Properly Sustained as Proper
"Consequential Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein.
(i)

Bearing in ntind the distinction above noted het\\·een
·'consequential da1nages" and "severance da1nages," ]t
\Yill nov,,. be den1onstrated that under our Constitution,
statutes, and decisions, ""consequential da1nages" 1nay he
a\\·arded in this State and \\Tere properly a\\,.arded under
the circumstances of the instant case.
47
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It n1ust at the outset be observed that "consequential damages" may not be R\varded under the rule prevailing in many of the jurisdictions of this country, n1ost
notable of \Yhich is the Federal rule prohibiting such an
a\\rard. + Nichols, id., 288 ~ 1-1.1 [1]. This fact n1ust be
borne in mind in examining many of the authorities cited
by appellant. The divergence of judicial opinion on this
subject results directly from the variance in the phraseology of the various constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the subject. 4 Xichols, id., § 14.1 [1].
For example, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States provides that:
'' . . . nor shall private property be -taken for
public use \Yithout just compensation." (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is no n1ention of "da1nage'' to private property for
public use in the Fifth A1nend1nent. This explains the
rule no\\T obtaining in the Federal Courts ; and this is the
rule that appellant urges like,Yise obtains in the State of
l.,.tah. l(eeping clearly in Yie\\T appellant's argtnnent that
dan1ages 1nay not be a\Yarded in the State of l~tah as a
result of public "-orks perfor1ned upon lands of another,
let us exa1nine our Constitutional and Statutory provision~ relating to the subject.
_A._rtirle I, ~eetion :!:! of the (_'ionstitution of the State
of lTtah i~ identical to that contained in the Federal Constitution except for one Yt>r~- i1nportant distinction. It
provide~ as follo\YS:
Pri Ya te propert~- shall not be taken or dama/;ed for public use "-ithout just con1pensation.''
( Eu1phasis supplied.)
48
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~eetion

78-34-10(3) lT.C.A., 1953, rnakes the distinction
even more apparent:
'~Cornpensation

and damages- how assessed
-The court, jury or referee rnust hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain
and assess:

*

*

*

( 3) If the property, though no part thereof
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of the
proposed improvement, the amount of such damages.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
The decisions of our Suprerue Court clearly indicate
that under our Constitution and Statutes, darnages rnay
be avvarded as a result of activities conducted upon lands
other than those belonging to the ovvner seeking the
a\vard. J( inzball v. Salt Lake City, 32 lTtah 253, 90 Pac.
395; Iienzpstead v. Salt Lake City, 3:2 l~tah 261, 90 Pac.
397; Cook v. Salt Lake City, -t-8 Utah 58, 157 Pac. 653, 645;
RolJi:nett v. Price, 7-± Utah 512, 280 Pac. 736; State 1_).
District Court Fo-urth Judicial District, 94 1}tah 384, 78
P.2d, 502, 508; Stockdale v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railzray Co., supra; State v. lVard, 112 Utah -±52, 189 P.
2d 113, 117.
In discussing the significance of the phraseology contained in Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as
broadening the scope of damages that rnay be a'varded
in en1inent domain proceedings in the State of lTtah, the
Supren1e Court stated in the case of State 1:. Distr1'ct
Court Fourth Ju-dicial District, supra, as follo\vs:
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·'~luch arglnnent n1ight be devoted to the que~
tion "~hether there i~ involved in this case a 'takinO''
or a 'dau1ao·ing·'
of 1n·o1)el'tY.
..._:\_hnost counta
a
·
.
less decisions of court~ n1ight be cited on e1th~r
side of the question. ll' e beliei:e, lunceL·er., ~hat 1n
incorJJoratiJZg

in the

cousf'ltutioll a provzszon re-

quiTing just con1pensation for property damaged
for public use, it 1.ras intended to put an end to
suclz controversy alld to protect the da1naged property ozcucr equally 1.rith the }Jroperfy ozrner 1rhose
land 1.ras pl1ysically e·utered npon. (En1phasis ~up
plied.)

The vie"~ announc-ed iunnediately above is consistent
'Yith one of the very earlie:-'t pronounce1nents upon thi~
:--uhject in this State contained in the case of Stockdale r.
Denrer & Rio (irande llr estern Rail-1ray Co., ..;;upra, "~here
in the Supre1ne Court upheld an injunction against defendant rail\Yay eou1pany prohibiting it fron1 the running
of ear~ and engine~ upon lands adjacent to those of the
plaintiff, \Yith the provi~o that if the defendant con1pany
proeeeds in en1inent do1nain, the injunction "~ould be dis~olvPd. The ·Court there stated:
~I any

of the earlier cases adopted the Ino1-e
restrictiYP con~trnction, and held that to bring a
en~<' "~ithin the foregoing prnYi~ion of the Constitn ti on (of the l Tn i ted 8 ta te8). there n1ns t be an
aetna l ph~T~iral appropriation of priYate property
~ought to lH• ('OllY('rted to a public n8-e: but ...
the gT(•at- "~eight of the n1ore recent judicial authorit~T. "·l1ieh "~e helieYe to be ~upported by the
l)<'tter l'('ason, and 'Yhirh i~ 111ore in accord "~th
our idea~ or eqnit~T and natural .iu~tice, holds that
an~.~ ~uh~tantial interfere~re \Yith priYate property
"~ 1ue h dP:-.; troy~ or 1na ten all~T le~sens its Yalt1e, or
H
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the ou·ner's ri,(;ht to its nse and ClljoyJnent ;, . ,. 'in any s11bstautial degree abridged or destroyed is, in fact and in law, a taking in the consti~tu.tion.al sense to the extent of the damages suffered, even though: the title and possession of the
owner remain u.ndiJstttrrbed.

!Jy tchich

*

*

*

Under the provisions of the Constitution of
this State herein before referred to (Article I,
Section 22), a party ''Those property is about to
he specially da1uaged in any substantial degree
for public use has the sa1ne rights and is given
the sa1ne re1nedies for the protection of his property fron1 the threatened injury as \\Tould he accorded hin1 if his property \Vere actually taken and
appropi"iated for such use. rrhat such is the spirit
and intent of the foregoing-provision of the Constitution is evident fro1n the tone and character of
the extended discussions on this question in the
constitutional convention at the time the provision
\Yas adopted and becan1e a part of the organic la-\v
of the State." (E1nphasis supplied.)
That section of our Code quoted above ( Sertion 7834-10 (3), U.C.A. 1953), has long been a part of our
statutory la\v. See, R. S., 1898, § ·3598. Our Supreme
Court in the case of Statr l·. TVa rd, sllpra, had occasion to
briefly 1nake reference to the quoted portion of that
Statute in the follcnYing \Yords:
"If there is no taking of part of the propert;.r
hut onl~r a da1naging as ronte1nplated h~T Paragraph (3) then ... "
The question for analysis is not, therefore, as appellant suggests, \vhether or not the damages awarded belo\v
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were a'varded as a result of the activities conducted b~T
appellant on lands other than those ·belonging to the respondents, since it is obvious from the foregoing authorities that such dan1ages may be in a 1)roper case recoverable. Rather the question for analysis is, under 'vhat circumstances may such da1nages be properly a'Yarded or,
stated another way, ,vhen are such damages of a type that
are peculiar or special to the property allegedly da1naged
and not of a type suffered by the lando,Yner in co1nn1on
'vith the public as a whole.
The case of State v. Distr·ict Court Fourth Judicial
District, supra, clearly indicates, and respondents concede, that not all dan1ages attributable to activity conducted upon adjacent lands are con1pensable. Only· such
damages as reach the ~'actionable degree~' 1nay be considered. It was there stated:
H\Y. e believe that the line of de1narcation
should be dra,vn at the point of actionable damage.
The Constitution clearly does not require conlpensation for dan1ages not recognized as actionable,
at con1n1on la,v, but for a da1nage of property
'to the actionable degree.' The Constitution Inakers intended the lando,vner to haYe just conlpensation equall~T 'vi th the lando"~ner "Those property
,,·a~ ph~Tsicall~T taken.··

As to "·hat i~ 1neant bY
. .. artionable dainag·es·· in the
la\\· of 'e1ninent rlon1ain is n1ore prerisel~T illustrated by
tlH' (\nrlier rn~l) of Tzccnf.IJ-Second Clorporation. etc. c.
()re,r;on ~C..,rhortline R. (\J .. 3() lTtah :.?~i~. 103 Par. :.?-t-3. ~-+S.
\Y11PrPin da1nages \Yer(\ sought under our Constitutional
provi::-;;ion, <luoted ahove, for annoyance and interference
..__
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\vith the carrying on of orderly undisturbed church
services. Plaintiff there con1plained of noises, blovving of
whistles and ringing of bells in connection \vith the operation of defendant railroad on adjoining land. The Court
held that damages of this type are not compensable, beeause the interference complained of was not one peculiar to the plaintiff, but rather shared by all the residents
along the railroad track in common with the plaintiff.
The Court, however, made the following important observations:
"It will be observed that in this case no question is raised \Vi th respect to interruptions of ingress and egress to and front the property alleged
to be damaged."

* * *
'' . . . The clause in the Constitution (of Illinois which is identical to that of Utah) is limited
to damages arising from some physical disturbance or interference with sante property right, as
distinguished froin mere annoyance.
* * *
" . . . In order to bring the case within the
damage clause of the Constitution there must
be some physical interference with the property
itself or with sante easenzent that constihdes nn
appurtenance thereto."

*

•)(e

*

"
. A critical examination of the cases cited
. will disclose that in nearly all, if not all of
them, some easement or appurtenance to the property in question was physically interfered 1Di,th.
" (Emphasis supplied.)
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Let u~ apply the foregoing concepts to the fact~
of the instant case. The record sho""\YS \Yithout dispute
that for 1nany years sheep have been trailed east and
\Yest aero~s the Little \Talley pit area, \Yhich area has
afforded the only natural and expedition~ pass for trailing sheep fro1n the ea:'t side of the n1ountain to the \Yestt}rn slope. This area \Yas sho\\~n to constitute a natural.
protective la1nhing ground in addition to and- as an adjunct of _the trailing operations. In short, it has been a
neePssary connecting link bet\Yeen respondents' lands
situated as they are. It 1nust, \Yithout serious contention,
be clearly deterurined to be a valuable appurtenance to
respondents' re1naining grazing lands. This appurtenanee
ha~ not only heen physically entered upon, but has been
physically cut a\\·ay leaYing in its stead a ya\Yning, Inanlllade hole, da1naging respondents to a substantial degree
in their use and enjoyn1ent of their re1naining lands bee a use of the nature of the use to \Yhich those lands had
heen, in fa(·t, put. It is at once clear that such a substantial interferenc-e doe~ not constitute that type that adjoining lando\Y'ners ( as~tnning such lando\Yners to haYe
existPd) having no peculiar interest in the use of the
ljittle \ .. alley- area, \Yould haYe shared in connnon \Yith
I'Pspondents. On the contrary. as a result of the use to
"·hieh respondPnts put their lands, and as a further result
of thp Yital and integral part that the Little \~alley area
pla~~e<i in ('Ol~nertion \Yith that nse. such danu1ges. it i~
snlnnitte<i, 111nst, of lH'<:Pssit~·, be of n t~·pe ~pecial and
lH'culiar to I'Pspondent~ · 118<.:' of their lands and not of a
kino shared in ronnnon \Yith the public generally.
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lt folio\\·~, therefore, that appellant's argtunent to the
pffect that the a\Yard appealed frorn cannot be sustained
because based in part upon appellant's operations on
lands of another, n1ust of necessity fail, \Yhen, as demon~trated above, such an award \vould have been proper
though based entirely upon such operations on lands of
another.
(ii) 'The Award Below for Damages to Respondents'
Remaining Lands Can Be S,ustained as Proper "Severance Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein.

If \Ye uta~' ass tune, for purposes of a rgtunent only,
that the dau1ages sustained hy l'Pspondents to their rPInaining lands by reason of the dPstruetion of the trailing easen1ent arross the Little\; alley pit area, \Yere not of
a type peculiar or special to such re1naining lands hut
\\~ere of a type shared \vith the general public in connnon,
nevertheless, it \\~ill no\\~ be dernonstrated that the a\\~ard
belo\Y, though based upon the operations of appellant upon the \Yhole pit area and not just upon that portion of the
pit area belonging to the respondents, is properly sustainable as ••severance da1nages" as that tern1 has heen
used herein. It should he re1nen1bered, as pointed out
earlier in this brief, that •·severance dan1ages" ernbraee
a rnore liberal concept than ··consequential da1nages'' in
that ""severance da1nages" 1nay he a\varded, though such
darnages are of a type that are not peculiar to the landov\"ner but shared in connnon \Yith the general puhlic.
··severance darnages," unlike "'consequential daHlages,,, as those terrns have been defined herein, are properly a\\. . arded in all the jurisdictions of this country in-
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eluding that of the Federal Government, because, as
pointed ·out above, land has actually been taken from a
landowner. See Section 78-34-10 (2), UCA, 1953. It
appears, ho"rever, to be the general rule that ordinarily
the depreciatio;n in value of the remaining lands is limited
to only such as is attributable to the use of the land taken
from the owner of the remainder area. There appears,
ho,vever, in reason and justice, to have developed a clearcut exception to this general rule. That exception may be
stated as follo,vs: That \Yhere the damages caused to an
owner's re1naining area by reason of the severance therefron1 of part of such tract are inseparable fron1 the dan1ages caused to the remainder area by the use of lands acquired from others, then the O\vner is entitled to his full
damage, though it be based in part upon the use of his
lands theretofore severed and the use of other lands. ±
Nichols, id., 315, §1-!-.21 [1], in speaking of the general
rule states as follo"~s:
"This rule has been criticized upon the ground
that it is difficult, if not in1possible~ to separate
one ele1nent fro1n the other~ and that under the
eiretunstances the O\Yner of the re1nainder area is
entitled to all dan1age caused by the use of an
entire project. _A. railroad. for instance. is an entire thing. It is in1possible for any hu1nan intelligenep to separate the loss or injur~~ \Yhich its operation causes. apportioning so n1uch to one portion
and so 1nueh to another.··
One of thP earlier casf•s to announce this exception
7
IS thP ease of Cllica,(/O [(_ l\:.. ;._\ llailzraJJ COJNj)(lJilf r. r·an
(? e·vc. G~ J(n 11. 6GG. 33 Pae. +I~. "Therein the <railroad
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contended that the landovvner should recover da1nage~
only for the injuries sustained by him because of the us,~
of the railroad of that part of its proposed right of \Yay
that \vas actually taken fro1n his land, and that nothing
could be recovered because of cuts and embankments or of
the construction and operation of the road on property
belonging to others. The Court, in disposing of this contention, stated as follows:
"The right to condemn the land is based upon
the necessity existing or at least supposed to exist
that the company should have it for use in connection vvith its road. We think the cuts, embankments tracks, ditches and right of way are to be
considered as one en tire thing in determining the
plaintiff's damages. Usually the appropriation of
a narrovv strip along one of the boundary lines of
a tract of land results in comparatively little daHlage to the land not taken, but it is not al\\Tays so,
and vvhere any portion of the plaintiff's land is
condernned, we are unable to conceive any rule
by \\rhich the plaintiff's damages could or should
be measured at either 1nore or less than the whole
damage -vvhich he actually sustains by reason of the
appropriation of his land, and the construction of
the road." (Emphasis supplied.)
.A_nd again in the case of Blesch v. Railu'ay Cornpany, -1:3
\Vis. 183, 2 N.vV. 113, it \vas stated as follo,vs:
"The counsel for the con1pany argued that
the plaintiff should recover such damages only as
resulted fro1n the six-inch roadbed encroachment
upon his pre1nises ... If by this it is meant that
the plaintiff should recover only the fractional
part of the damages which the construction and
operation of the road worked to his premises, a
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bare stateinent of the proposition is ~ufficient. to
sho\\" its unsoundness. A railroad 1s an entire
thing, and it is ilnvossible for any hun1~n ~ntelli
gence to separate the lo~s or injury \Ylnch It:-; operation cause:-;, apportioning so Inuch to one portion and so Inuch to another."
In the case of Ila[J!J((rd r. 1'he .._{lgolla School District~
113 lo\\~a -±86, 85 X.\\'. 777, ",.herein a half lot \Yas severed
fron1 plaintiff'·:-; property for u~e together \\"ith other
property in the construction of a scho-ol site, it \\"as ~tated:
""\Vl1o can say in this case, for instance, ho'v
u1uch the inconvenience due to the proxilnity of
the school building on the balance of this block
"~ould be increased by the fact that the half lot in
(1uestion ,,,.as included in the schoolhouse site~
. . . if the legislature has provided that a n1ore
liberal Inea~ure of ro1npensation shall be adopted
-one "Thieh give~ to the 1nan "~ho~e property is
taken eo1npen~ation for dainages '"·hieh he actuall)~
~uffer~, although one \Yho~e land is not taken n1ust
~uffpr the ~a111e injury \Yithout eoinpensationthen the eorporation ",.hieh seeks to take the land
un1~t ~uh1ni t. ... ,,~ e see no reason, therefore, ",.h)T
the ineonYenienre due to the proxi1nity of the
~rhoolhou~P. a~ affecting the 1narket Yalue of appellee'~ residence property, should not haYe been
taken into account.··
of --:lodrcu·.-.,· r. ( 1o.r. 1:.?~1 Conn. 415. ~9 . .\.
~d G87, a ~1nall triangular portion nf the plaintiff"s propert~,. \\,.a~ taken for n~P in the construction of a raised
hig]n,,.n~ ... thP <'lllhanlnnent for "Thich ~tarted on the land
taken. rrhe ( ionrt ~tated a~ follo\\T~:
In thP

ra~<'

~~rt

"Tould he YPr~T difficult to separate the
58
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effeet upon the value of the plaintiff's re1naining
land of so n1uch of the e1nbanku1ent as \vas on the
land taken fron1 the effect upon that value of the
e1nbankrnent as a \Vhole. :~ * * The ele1nent of cause
and effect is present in any a"Tard for depreciation
in the value of the re1naining land due to the use
of the land taken for the 1naking of the iinprovernent; dan1ages of that kind are given because they
are eaused by the use of the land taken; and ",.here
the making of the i1nprovement requires as an integral and inseparable part the use of the land
taken, though th-e improvement-as a whole extends
to adjoining land, that us~ is a contributing cause
of the effect produced by the entire i1nprove1nent
* * * Where the use of the land taken constitutes
an integral and inseparable part of the single use
to "'"hich the land taken and other adjoining land
is put, the effect of the \vhole i1nprovement is
properly to be considered in estirnating the depreciation in value of the ren1aining land."
Recently the Supre1ne Court of the State of l\Iinnesota adopted the exception announced above and modified the la"T of that State as theretofore announced in
the case of ""-4da;ns r. Ch.icago B. & ~r. R. Co.) 39 ~linn.
286, 39 N.,v-. 629, ",.hen in the ease of C ity of C roolo-don
c. Erickson, 69 X.\V. 2d 909, 91-± (~Iinn.1955), it held that
a landovYner 1nay be entitled to recover da1nages for the
depreciation of his re1naining land caused h~,. the erection
of a se,yage disposal plant in part upon lands ~Pvered
fron1 the 0\\ ner's tract and in part upon lands helonging
to others. The court stated in the Erickson case:
1

1

7

'''Ve therefore n1odify the rule of the _..\clains
case to the extent that ,,,.here a part of an o\vner's
land is taken for a public irnprove1nent :-:uch as
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this, and the part taken constitutes an ir~.tegral
and inseparable part of a single use to. 'vh1ch the
land taken and other adjoining land lS put, the
owner is entitled to recover the full damage to
his remaining property due to such publi? ~m
provement even though portions of the publ1c lillprovement are located on land taken from surrounding owners."
In the case of Campbell ~-. ['nited State.i, 266 l~.s.
368, 69 L.Ed. 328 (1924), -,vhich case is cited in appellant's
brief, the district court had found separately the danlages sustained by the owner to his re1naining lands as the
result of the use to \vhich the land taken fron1 hin1 harl
been put and separately the an1ount of damages sustained
as a result of the \Yhole i1nprovement. The Supreme
(~ourt held that the lando,vner \vas entitled only to the
for1ner amount, and in so doing, n1ade reference to the
Blesch, T""an Cle~·e, and Haggard cases, cited above. The
court noted, ho\vever, as follo·w. s :
"In each of these cases, it \Yas in1possible separately to ascertain the da1nages caused to the reInainder of the o\vner·s tract by the taking and
proposed use of a part of it. In this case such
daJJlO{!CS 1rere separatel,lt found. alld plaiHtiff
doe.-..' not con1plain in re8pect of tlze anzount of
tlzat c!c;nenf.'' (En1phasis supplied.)
In light of the exception announced to the general

rul<) by the foregoing authorities. it is proper that \Ye
exc.unine the lTtah Statute dealing specifieally \Yith ··seYerancP dau1ages." Section 78-34-10 ( 2). lT. C.~\ .. 1953 proYidPs that there n1n~t be assessed:
60
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·~ ( ~)

If the property sought to be conde1nned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the damages which vvill accrue to the portion not sought
to be conden1ned by reason of its severance from
the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the i1nprovement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is significant, vve sub1nit, that our Statute does
not limit a landowner solely to the da1nages to his rernaining lands resulting fro1n the severance alone. It
states clearly that such damages shall be a\\Tarded as may
be sustained by reason of ( 1) "its severance fron1 the
portion sought to be condemned,'' and ( 2) "the construction of the improven1ent in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff." Viewed in the light least favorable to the
respondents, it is submitted that the legislators by enacting such a statute have clearly ingrained into the la'v
of this State the exception to the general rule above
announced. \Tie,ving the Statute in the light most favorable to the respondents, it rnay be suggested that damages may be thereunder awarded to the ren1aining lands
as a result of the entire project \vithout regard to "Thether
that part thereof \Yhich is conducted upon lands severed
is an integral and inseparable part of the \vhole.
Be that as it 1nay, ho\vever, it is subrnitted that the
facts in the record, in any event, clearly fall \vithin the
exception to the general rule above noted. The pit excavated by appellant represents one entire project. It seen1s
an obvious fact that respondents' lands taken constituted
an inseparable part of the whole pit. Who can say, \vith
any degree of reason, hovv rnuch of the damage to re61
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~pondents' ren1a1n1ng lands \\·as eansed by the renloYal
of the 1nillions of c·ubic yard~ of gravel fron1 their lands
alone and ho\\· 1nuch of that da1nage \Yas caused by thereInoval of the 1nillions of cubic yard~~ of gravel fron1 other
lands, apportioning so 1nuch to one and so 1nuch to another. It is sul11nitted that it is clear fron1 the record that
it \Yould he absolutely in1possible '"for any hlnnan intelligence" to accurately deter1nine ho\Y 1nuch of the dilninution of respondent~' re1naining land~ \Yas attributable
solel~~ to the excavation done on their lands. It is subnlitted that such dan1ages cannot he separated and that
re~pondents' lands taken forn1ed an inseparable and integral part of the entire pit.
It is, therefore subn1itted that the da1nage to respondents' re1naining lands 1nay be properly a\\~arded fron1 the
ex<·avation of the entire pit area, although part of that
a rea be upon lands belonging to others upon either the
theor~~ of Hconsequential dan1ages. ·· as that tern1 is used
herein, and/ or under the 1nore liberal concept of ··severanee da1nage~. '' a~ that tern1 is used in this brief.
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BELOW TO RESPONDENTS' RElVIAINING LANDS WERE FOR THE DEPRECIATION IN 'THE VALUE OF THOSE LANDS AND
NOT L 0 S S E S TO THE BUSINESS ·CONDUCTED
THEREON.
(c)

rrbi~

(iourt I~ urged h~- appellant to OYt?l"-tUI'll the
jnrlg-Hlent helo"· for the rea~on that the ~o-called severn 11('( da lll ag·p~ a \\•n nierl he 1owr ,,·ere, in eff ert' danlagt'~
rP~ulting to the ~heep operation~ of the respondent~
and tl1~1t, therpf'ore. the saiHE\ heing a da 1 nag~ to the
I
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business of re~pondent~, is not properly recoverable in
e1ninent dontain proceedings, if at all. Appellant relies
in Inaking this contention upon certain testin1ony adduced
fro1n respondent Chournos and quoted on Page 35 of
appellant's brief. Although respondents do not quarrel
"rith the lavv as announced by the decisions cited by
appellant, it is sub1nitted that appellant has Inisinterpreted and 1nisconstrued the purpose and the nature of
the testilnon~~ offered and has 1nisapplied the la\\? to
the facts of this case.
The testirnony clearly sho\vs that the 1neasure of
dantages clairned for the re1naining lands of the respondents and testified to by the respondent Chournos
and \Yitness Keller \vas the rli1ninHti·on in the nzarkct

value of the land as a result of the proposed improveJneJlt, to "Tit: the excavation (Tr. 171, 183-185, 232).

The 1neasure of darnages utilized \vas not, as one n1ight
suspect fron1 reading appellant's brief and the abstracts
of the decisions contained therein, loss of profits, de~truction of livestock, or loss of good \vill.
It \vas both proper and necessary for respondents
to sho\\T belo\v the use to \vhich respondents' re1naining
lands \vere plainly adapted and the use to \vhich such
lands had, in fact, been put, and to further sho\v that
the Little , . . alley area in \vhich the huge excavation
pit -\,Tas dug by appellant for1ned an integral part of
that use. It "Tas the use of respondents' re1naining lands
and the use to \vhich those lands \Yere plainly adapte(l
that gave then1 value. The use to \Yhich the land is
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adapted and has been put is always a relevant inquiry
insofar as it affects the market value of the land.
4 Nichols, id., 38, §12.2 [3], et seq. states as follo\vs:
"Generally speaking, the true r~le seems to
be to permit proof of all the var1ed elements
of value; that is, all the facts which the O\Vner
\vould properly and naturally press upon the attention of a buyer \vith \vhom he is negotiating
a sale and all the facts \Yhich would naturally
influence a person of ordinary prudence desiring
the purchase. In this estimation, the owner is
entitled to have consideration given to all the
capabilites of the property, to the business or
use, if any, to u·hich it has been de1.-:oted, and
to any and every use to \Yhich it 1nay reasonably
be adapted or applied. And this rule includes
the adaptation of value of the property for any
legiti1nate purpose or business, even though it
has never been so used and even though the
O\\~ner has no present intention to devote it to
such use.'' ( En1phasis supplied.)
And at 263, §13.3 [1] :
'"\\~here

the character of the property is such,
ho\\·('ver, that independently of the labor, skill
or kno\v1edge of its O\Ynei\ it lends itself peeuliarl~r to a particular nse. a busiJless based upOJ 1
such u,-..·c. and then the profits therefron1 1nay be
considered in a~certaining· the 1narket Yalue of the
land. Al~o. "~here such b~siness contributes all or
thP principal part of the value of the land, it has
h(\en held that consideration Ina~· be g1ven to sneh
businPs8. '' (l~~u1pha8is supplied.)
1\fol'('OVt\r, <'Prtain portions of respondents' re1nain1np; lanrls. partienlral~· those of respondent ('1hournos,
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were disconnected fro1n the parcel actually taken ( Tr.
1-l--l--147). The la\v appears to be rather clear that where
severance darnage is clailned for remaining lands that
are parcels separated fro1n the parcel condemned and
severed, that severance darnages may not ordinarily
be a \Yarded unless it be shown that the several parcels
constituted one economic unit. 4 Nichols, id., 426, 428,
§14.3, discusses this proposition as follows :
"It is Vt7 ell settled that \Vhen the whole or a
part of a particular tract of land is taken for
the public use, the owner of such land is not
entitled to compensation for injury to other separate and independent parcels belonging to him
which results from the taking.

* * *
"If, as a matter of fact, however, the contiguous parcels constitute one tract, so far as
actual use by the o"\vner is concerned, it has been
held that the contiguous parcel may be considered
as a remainder area and the damages ascertained
upon that basis. Thus, if several parcels together
constitute one farm, operated as a unit, the
dan1ages must be considered to the entire farm."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The question then arises as to "Then are t\vo tracts
of land contiguous as that term is used in the quotation above. 4 Nichols, id., 432, et seq., §14.31 [1] ans,vers
this question as follows:
"Actual contiguity between tVtro separate
parcels is ordinarily essential to merit consideration as a unified tract. Actual physical separation by an intervening space bet\veen two parcels
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belonging to the san1e O\\Tner is ordinarily ground
for holding that the parcels are. t~ be treated
as independent of each other, but 1t IS _not necessarilv a conclusive test. If th f land 1s c~rct1J}ally
occu JJied or in 1tse, the u niJty of the use i~ the
ch£ef cri'terioru. \"Vhen t\YO parcels are physically
distinct, there 1nust be such a connection or relation of adaptation, convenience and actual and
per1nanent use as to 1nake tlze enjoyn1.ent of one
reasonably necessary to the eujoynlent of the
other ill the nzost advantageous 1nanner in the
business for 1chich it i:; ·used, to constitute a
sing! e J)(l reel 1rit hi n the nz ea n i-ng of the rule.''
( E1nphasis supplied.)
1_,he C~ourt'~ attention i~ directed to the case of
(;raud Rirer Danz ..._4uthority c. Thonzpsou, llS F.2d,
2-l-:2 (lOth (~ir. 19-!1), "Therein the question 1ras raised
a~ to \vhether or not it \Yas a question for the Court
or for the jury to deter1nine \Yhether t\vo certain tracts
of land constituted one unit or separate independent
tract~. The Court in its treat1nent of this question,
di~en~~ed the ~o-called unit rule (expressed in the quotation ahoYe) at son1e length and \Yith exhaustiYe citation, indicating celarly that it is oYer"Thehningly the
general rule of thi~ country. It i~ apparent that the
application of the unit rule in deter1nining seYerance
dainagP~. hy it~ 'TPr~~ definition, '"·ould he all but in1po~~ihle ,,·ithont a ennsideration of the use to w·hich
tlH• land it~Plf i~ put and thi~ i8 true ·w·hether the n~e
to "·hiell tlH• land he put be that of a farn1 operation,
as i~ the u~ual ea~P, or a liYe8tock operation as in the
in~h:tnt <·a~P. Cl'. Proro Rircr 1rater rrsers ~-t-.:soci(lfion
r. ('a rl.-.:on, 10;1 fTtah 9~1, 133 P.:.?d 777. It is ~ulnnitted
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that unity of use being the criterion, no reasonable
logical distinction Inay be n1ade on the basis of the
nature of the particular use to \vhich the land is put.
This is illustrated clearly in the case of City of 1 ulsa
v. Horwitz) 131 Okla. 63, 267 P~ 85:2, 854, wherein the
doctrine \\·as applied by reason ·of the use of tw·o parcels
in a unified p1pe supply business, \vherein the court
stated:
1

HThe evidence sho,,·~ that the tvvo lots were
separated h)· a :20-foot alley but that the)? \vere
suitable for and intended to be and had been
used in the pipe supply business, \Vere bought
:• at the san1e ti1ne and intended to be used for
that purpose, and had al\vays been used together,
so that the taking of a part of Lot 1 necessarily
affected the value of Lot :2 to son1e extent."
i\ very recent pronounceutent b)r our Supre1ne (_ iourt
in the case of vVebet~ ]]a.-.,· in Water ( 10Ju.,·erca JlC.IJ Dis! rict
v. Ward) et a!) 3-!7 P .2d 862, SG-! ( li tab, 1959) clearly
indicates that f'"tah is a1nong those jurisdictions eonlInitted to the unit rule and that further in its application, the nature and extent of the business conductefl
upon the land is a vital and necessary consideration for
the court and jury. In that case, the respondents operated a dairy farn1 and claiu1ed and "rere a\vardecl suhstantial darnages as a result of the severance of the
land conde1nned. The court held that it \\"as error for
the trial court to prohibit exa1nination as to the profitable operation of respondents' dairy, the lnu·; in fss conducted upon the land in question, and in so doing, ~tated
as follo,vs:
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"The objections of the defense couns~l a~d
the rulings of the court prevented effe_ct1ve Inquiry into the important and materval fa·ct:
Whether the dairy farm was in fact a well-balanced economic unit as the defendant claimed."
( E1nphasis supplied.)
It is submitted, therefore, that appellant has failed
to dra\Y the necessary distinction bet\\Teen measure of
dainages, on the one hand, and use, adaptability to use,
and unity of use of the lands involved by reference to
the business conducted thereon, on the other. The evidence clearly sho\Yed that the proper measure of danlages \\'"as the diminution in the value of the laiid and
the court's instruction to the jury clearly encompassed
this n1easure ( Tr. 350, 351). There can be, therefore, no
error based upon the presentation of the e-vidence attacked by appellant, for suc.h evidence under the circumstances of this case, \Yith regard to the issue of
severance damages~ \Yas not only proper but necessary.
(d) THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS'
REMAINING LANDS WERE NOT THE RESULiT OF
ADDING VALUES FOR THE DIFFERENT USES OF
THE LANDS TAKEN.

Appellant as an additional reason for reYersal,
contends that the a"Tard belo\Y \Yas arrived at by adding
t hP value~ of the different u~es for the land taken.
A fair appraisal of the argn1nent presented by appellant
in thi~ eonnPetion indicntt·~ that appellant contends that
l'P~pondents Ina~· not reeoYer for the Ya1ue of the sand
and gTaYel taken and also, in addition thereto, the
Yalne of the ~trip of respondents' respec.tiYe lands upon
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\vhich the pit \vas excavated and fro1n \vhich the gravel
deposit \\·as extracted. It is submitted that this argulltent also 1nisconceives the nature of the evidence and
the a\vard below. The award below \vas, of course, in
t\vo parts. The first vvas for the value of the sand and
gravel taken on a unit basis at a fixed price per unit,
\vhich the jury determined to be three cents per cubic
yard of gravel. A determination on that basis \vas
necessary because appellant did not seek to take the
land itself but rather sought a right of way upon the
land for the purpose of excavating therefrom the gravel
and fill n1aterial. As pointed out earlier in this brief,
there \\Tas thus presented for the trial court below an
exeeption to the general rule that the profits, price, or
value of minerals, taken separately, may not be considered in determining the value of the land condemned.
Cf. State of Utah v. Noble, sttpra.
In addition to the value of the gravel deposit taken
by appellant the respondents also claimed severance
and/or consequential damages to their remaining lands.
Appellant apparently fails to take cognizance of the
fact that these damages are based upon the din1inution
in the value of the remainjng lands of respondents by
reason of the severance of a portion thereof by appellant
and as a result of the construction of the improven1ent
here involved, to \vit: The excavation of the pit area
fron1 ''Thich the sand and gravel \vere extracted. This
a1nount is not, as appellant claims, additional conlpensation for the lands taken, but is clearly an award for
the damages sustained to the remaining lands belonging
to respondents.
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· l{espondents again do not quarrel \Yith the la\Y a:'
announced bv the authorities cited in appellant's brief.
:Ho,vever, th.e respondents invite the eourt's attention
to the fact that each citation dea1s \Yith the proposition
of double coutpensation for the land actually taken and
do not deal at all \Yith the question of severance and/or
consequential da1nages to rentaining lands. The lR\Y a~
announced hy these various authoritie~ have no application \Yhatsc)t-Yer to the question of severance or ronsequential da1nages to other lands and a fortiori no
application to the i~sues sought to be raised in this
appeal.
It is possible, of coursE\ that an a\Yard of double
da1nages n1ight conceivably result in a particular type
of ca~e. ~-,or exau1ple, in the instant case. had appellant
seen fit to eonde1nn the lands belonging to respondent~
in the Little \"""alley area, rather than the fill material
c-ontained therein, and the Court below'" had a\varded
an enhanced Yalue of these lands by reason of such
lands for1ning an integral part of all of respondents'
lands. rather than an a\Yard of its actual value considered separate and apart fron1 respondents' land~.
and then. in addition. also a\\·arded seYerance da1nages
to the rentaining lands. there n1ight conceivably be a rase
Inadp out for double da1nages. 'rn further illustrate,
if thP respondents' lands had been actually eonden1ned
and \\Tithout considering all of the land~ O\Yned by respondents of \\Thieh the lands taken foru1ed a part. tlw
lands taken \\Tere of a Ya lnt• of $~0.00 per acre. but that
su<'h Ynlne \Yas Pnh:lnced, h~· rea~on of it con~titutin~
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on integral part of these other lands, to $30.00 an aere,
and then 8everance danutges \Yere a\\?arded in addition
to the enhanced value, double da1nages \vould probably
result. See ± Nichols, id., 331 ~14.23 [1].
1-Iowever, as pointed out above, this was 1nost definitely not the case below. The value of the rock and
fill 1naterial \vas separately evaluated, and under no
posture of the evidence. adduced belo\v could it conceivably he said that that value \Yas fixed in consideration
of the use of such rock and fill 1naterial in eonnPetion
\vith the balance of the lands o\vned h)? the respondents.
~\_ppellant

cites the case of .J/orlon IJutler 7'iJJtl)er C o.
v. l "niHed States, 91 :F,. ~d 88-1-, in his arglunent upon
this point, "~herein the O\\'"ner atten1pted to recover not
only for the value of the ti1nber taken frou1 his land,
but also for the stun1page value of the tin1ber. It is
subrnitted that a 1nore avpropriate and applieable exanlple \vould he one "?herein the lando,v-ner o\vned !l
hon1e site surrounded hy forest land and "?here the
conden1ning authority conden1ned a right of \\'"a~r onl~,.
upon the forest land to denude it and take a\\'"ay the
ti1nber gro,v-ing thereon. ·Could it then he said, hy any
stretch of the i1nagination, that pa~,.rnent by the condeinning authority for the resulting cli1ninution in value
of the O"\\. .ner's ho1ne site by reason of the loss of shade,
cover, protection, and general beauty previously afforded
to the hon1e site area by the forest need not be 1na(le
since the lando\vner has already been cornpensated for
that loss ""'hen he received payn1ent for the tirnher at
1
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its fair market value per board foot~ One need not
be a real estate expert to realize that the value of
the home site has been greatly diminished by the taking
of the trees. On the contrary, there is a clear and distinct
damage resulting to the owner's remaining land that
should be _properly paid in addition to the value of
the timber taken. So it is in the instant case.
It is submitted, therefore, that appellant's argument
seeks by son1e verbal legerden1ain to t\vist the situation
as reflected in the record into something \Yhich is clearly
not justified by the evidence.
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD
UPON WHICH THE JURY PROPERLY BASED THEIR
FINDING OF DAMAGES 'TO RESPONDENTS' REMAINING LANDS.
(e)

The record clearly reflects that the respondent
Chournos and the \Yitness Boyd I~eller, \vho together
represented a co1nbined total of at least si..~ty years'
experience in the sheep and liYestock business conducted
upon the Yer~T area in question ( Tr. 15-t 221). testified
that, in their respectiYe opinions, the diininution in the
value of respondents' re1naining lands as a result of
tlH• excavation of the pit by appellant \Yas at least a
~0 ft' depreciation, in the opinion of Chournos, and a
~;>~~ deprc~rintion, in the opinion of l(eller ( Tr. 171,
lS:~-1 S5, ~3~). rPhe record further reflects that the rental
l'Pe<'ived fron1 the Hnnter-_.A_rthur lands \ras $7,000.00
annually ( Tr. 170). \\'"ithout an~- consideration being
gi V(\11 the 90,000 HCl'PS of the (~hournos lands \\-hich are
loeated else\\·her(\' tlH\ record and exhibits sh 0 ,,- that the
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l)ro1nontory ~lountain lands of respondent Chournos are
identical to those of respondents I-I unter and Arthur
in quality, location and use, and that as a matter of
fact, Chournos, Hunter and Arthur own undivided interests in several of the same parcels, \vhich fact required
the establishu1ent of herd lines (Tr. 199, 200). It was
clearly presented to the jury that a 20-year capitalization of the annual return on a tract of leased land
is proper and acceptable to arrive at the value thereof
(Tr. 232). It is submitted, therefore, that although no
specific 1narket values of respondents' remaining lands
\\Tere given, either before or after the excavation of the
pit area, under the testimony given, such values \vould
be simply the result of a mathematical computation
involving the multiplication of the rental value times
:20 to arrive at the market value before the excavation
of the pit and, using the opinion given by \vitness Keller
as to the amount of depreciation, simply depreciating
that value 25% to arrive at the value after the excavation of the pit- the difference representing the dan1ages
clai1ned. Appellant apparently novv seeks a nevv trial
on the basis that the Inathematical computation above
referred to vvas performed and only the end results
thereof, namely, the amount of dan1ages, rather than
the '"before" and "after" values of the land, given to
the jury.
5 Nichols id., 346, §23.3, 1n discussing this very
issue states as follows:
"Once it is conceded that the \vitness may
state the before and after values it is a 1nere
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1natter ·of forn1 ,v·hether the si1nple Inatheinatical
co1nputation of arriving at the da1nage hy subtracting the value after fron1 the value before
the taking i:-; to be 1nade h~~ the \Yitness or hy
the jury. It i:-; accordingly held in 1nany juri~
dictions that a duly qualified expert may testify
directly as to the a1nount of the da1nage * * *.
In ~<nne of the state~ in \Yhiclr ~uch testi1nony i~
not considered ~trictly co1npetent, its ad1nission
is not necessarily a cause for setting aside a
YE~rdict other\\~i~e unobjectionable. The n1oderll
teudency is to discard arbitrary rules of erideHce
1rhich hare no substantial principle behind them,
lJut 1rlziclt continually int~ol1·e the court and coun.~·el in quibbles o0er the fornz in u·hich inter'rogatories shall be put. It has been said that opinion
fridence nzay be allozred o.f the din1inutio·n in
1·alu e u;itho ut a state nze nt o.f the before and after
·calues." (En1phasis supplied.)
'"The fact that the co1nputations of the Yalues of
the re1naining property "before" and ·•after" utilize the
capitalization of the rental return of the property involved doc~ not render such testin1ony incon1petent.
'''"hen appellant refer~ to the use of rental Yalue as
Hartificial'' and ··deeeptiYE\ ~~ it is oYerlooking a rather
ha~ie and roininon-sense device in the fixing of land
Yaluation~ ..A~ ~tated in 3 Xichols id.~ 213, §19.:2:
··Ho\Yever~ a~

~afe

\Yorking rule, i.f property
is rentrd for the usc to 1rhich it is best adapted,
the actual rent re<. .·crred, capitalh:ed at the rate
1rhich local custon1 adopts for the purpose . .fo·nns
one of the best tests of. ralue. and arcordinO'lr
b •
Pvid<\nep of the rent actually rereiYed at a ti1ne
rea~onahly near the p1u1rt 1un tr> n1 paris of the
taking ~hould he ad1nitted." (En1phasi~ supplied.)
a

~
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T'ltis has long been thP la\\"' of this jurisdiction. In
the ease of ().rJrlen L. & I. Ry. Co. c. Jones, 51 lTtah G~,

168 J>ac. 548, 550, the railroad co1npany alleged error
upon the part of the lower court in allo,,·ing the landowner's counsel to elicit on eross-exa1nination the rent
paid for the land in question in the year 1914. The
crucial date for the fixing of value \Ya~ ...\ ugust 6,
1915. [It should be noted that the rental value testified
to in the instant case \Yas fixed on the prPeise date of
the oceupancy of these lands by appellant (Tr. 170.]
It \Yas f-;tated hy our Supren1e Court as follo\\·s:
''The general holding of the courts is to the
effect ho\vever that for the purpose of proving
value of the pre1nises in question it is proper
to sho\v the rental value of the pre1nises and
\Yhat rents \Yere paid therefor at and for a reasonable ti1ne before the action \vas connnenced."
There \vas placed before the jury helo\\· eoutpetent
and uncontradicted evidence of: 1. the rental value of
the lands involved; 2. the aceeptable rate that local
custon1 has adopted for the capitalization of rental value
to arrive at 1narket value; and 3. the percentage of
dintinution in that value as a result of the i1nprove1nent.
There "·as also placed before the jury the proper rneasure of da1nages ~tated in the court's instructions ( Tr.
350, 351). Frorn this, the jury could and did properlydra\\"' its conclusion as to the an1ount of dantage su:--:tained . .:\ppellant hy seeking a ne\v trial, and the additional expensive and prolonged litigation that a ne\\"'
trial entails, in order to establish the "'before" and
.. after'' values of the land involved \vhen these values
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are n1erely mathematical conclusions easily drawn froin
the factual testimony in the record,·. s-eeks, it is submitted, to sarcifice the ends of fair and practicable justice
for the sake of a mere formal technicality.
POINT III.
BASED ON THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD,
IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE VERDICT BELOW WAS
EXCESSIVE AND THE RESUUT OF PASSION AND PREJUDI·CE.

Respondents \vill not burden the court \Yith a prolonged recital of the competent evidence presented below
respecting valuation and damage. That evidence has
been detailed at some length earlier in this brief.
Suffice it to say that the testimony given, b~~ \vay
of direct opinion, co1nparable sales, .and analysis of the
nature and adaptibility of the property here involved,
by seven \Yell-qualified, experienced \vitnesses clearly
suports a verdict fixing valuation at 3c per cubic yard
for the 1naterial taken. The over\vheln1ing strength of
this testi1nony is 1nore apparent when Yie'' in the light
of appellant's testin1on~~ ·offered to contradict: one conlparable sale n1ade to the conde1nnor itself:* and opinion
testin1on~T offered b~~ only one "yitness of lin1ited experience and en1ployed b~~ the Yery contractor to \vhon1
appellant furnished the 1naterial conde1nned.
The testi1nony offered by respondents to support
-x-In most jurisdictions, evidence of sales to the condemnor i~
not admissible. Anno. 118 A.L.R. 893; cf. Weber County ;.
Ritchie, 98 Utah 272, 96 P. 2d 744.
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thP da1uages resulting fron1 the taking ,,.a8, a8 indieated
Parlier herein cou1petent and proper and the result of
a lifeti1ne of experience in livestock operation, upon
the vPr~· ground in question. l\[ oreover, this testi1nony
\\·a8 eo1npletely uncontradicted! The valuation fixed and
the da1nages a\varded -vvere \vithin the li1nits fixed hy
all \\'itnesses called by respondents, \vith the exception
of respondent Chournos himself whose testimony as to
dan1age \vas $28,000.00, \vhereas l{:eller's \vas $35,000.00
(Pages 19, 21 of this brief).
In light of the evidence adduced belo\\·, \vhich \vould
elParl~T support verdicts in excess of those returned
by the jury, it is submitted that the follo\ving rule
pronounced by this court in the early case of Brae g,r; e r
v. O.S.L.R.R. Co., 2± Utah 391, 397, 68 J?ae. 140, is
dispositive of appellant's contention:
"The appellant co1nplains that the verdict
appears to be excessive, and given under the
influence of passion or prejudice and is not
justified by the evidence. The ans\ver to this is
that under our ·Constitution the a1nount of the
verdict is a matter entirely \vithin the province
of the trial court and jury, the san1e being a
question of fact. If there is any evidence to support the verdict, this court has no po,ver to pass
upon it, or to set the verdict aside as being
excessive." (Emphasis supplied.)
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
PAYMENT OF THE JUDGl\IENT EN'TERED BELOW IN
CASE NO. 8192 TO BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING
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THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHALLENGE BY THE
UNITED STA'TES TO THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS'
MINING CLAIMS.

The Respondents, ~filton A. 01nan, \ . . irginia S.
01nan, Sautuel X. Chournos, .] anice R. Chournos, Xick
(;hournos, and Dorothy J(. Chournos, hereinafter referred to as respondents, have filed a cross appeal in
this action, appealing fro1u the order 1nade and entered
hy the eourt belo\Y on N ove1nber :2, 1959, in Case X o.
819:2, "~hereunder appellant \Yas per1nitted to deposit
''"·ith the clerk of the court belo\Y its payn1ent of the
judg1nent entered in said case to be held pending an
adntini~trative deter1nination of a challenge to the validity of respondents' sand and gravel placer mining claims
1nade b~~ the l~nited States Govern1nent and presently
pending before the lTnited States Depart1nent of the
Interior.
'l.,he gravel deposit extracted by appellant in Case
X o. 81~):2 \Yas fron1 certain govern1nent lands upon \Yhieh
~aid re~pondent~ had located certain sand and gravel
placer 1nining clai1ns. The jury belo\Y found that the
Yalne of the 1,:!:2:2,899 cubic yards of graYel and fill
utaterial extraeted fro1n these clain1s "~as 3c per cubic
yard, or a total of $36,686.97 ( Tr. 36:2). ·
It i~ the po~ition of respondents that regardless of
the u] tiu1ate deterutination 1nade by the lTnited State~
])eparhnent of Interior, or such Federal (,ourt as 1nay
thPreafter a~su1ne jurisdietion of the contest filed by
the GoYPrlnnent, that a~ bet\Yeen respondents and appellant in the instant ease, the forn1er are to he conL
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~iderPd

the o\vner~ of the gravel deposits extracted and
Pntitled to con1pensation therefor.
It 1nay be conceded, for the sake of argu1uent only,
that ulti1nately it 1nay be deter1nined at another tin1e
and in other proceedings that as agaill.st the Lr nited
Htatcs Gover1unent, respondents possessed no rights
in the placer clai1ns fron1 which the gravel here involved
\\'as extracted. Such a result, ho\vever, can in no "·ay
affect the obligation of appellant in the instant ca~P .
..Lc\ppellant, both in its co1nplaint and at the trial
helo\\'", ackno\vledged respondents to be the locators of
H~ placer 1nining claiu1s na1ned Sand X o. 2 and Sand
Xo. 3" (Par. 3 Cou1plaint; Tr. 18) upon the area 1n
(1uestion and fron1 \vhich the gravel \Yas extracted .
. .c\ppellant \Yent upon the land and extracted the
a1nount of gravel aforesaid under the order of innnediate
occupaney granted by the trial court in accordance \\·ith
I>aragraph 2 of the prayer of appellant's co1nplaint.
It is significant that no order \Yas sought as again:--:t
the l"'"nited States, if indeed such an order could be
1nade; nor \Vas the party in \\·ho1n appellant no\v contends
has better title than respondents, nan1ely, the ·l..,.nited
State~, ever 111ade a part~· to nor did the Govern1nent
intervene in this action at any stage of the proceeding~.

By I>aragraph -± of the prayer of its con1plaint,
appellant agreed to pay the value assessed in these
proceedings to Hthe person or persons \\,.ho n1ay he
adjudged entitled thereto." Certainly, appellant cannot
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no\v contend that the adjudication to "~hich it then had
refernce \Va~ one that \Yas to be 1nade hy another tribunal
in another proceeding.
A~ stated above, appellant stipulated that respond-

ents \vere the 1nining clai1nan ts to the land in question
and \Yere conceded to be the "locators" of said clain1s
in plaintiff's con1plaint; and testi1nony \vas adduced by
appellant itself sho,ving this to be the fact (Tr. 216).
K o evidence \\~as offered by appellant to contest this
fact nor to contest the validity of respondents~ clai1ns,
for appellant clearly did not assert any interest in
itself or any other person in such land by \vay of
relocation or other\vise, nor did appellant offer any
proof that respondents' rights had been ter1ninated by
the Governn1ent at the ti1ne of appellanfs entry. for
indeed that que~tion is still pending.

1~ nder the posture of the evidence 1n the record,
together ,,·ith the pleadings on file. it i~ sub1nitted that
it 1nu~t be prestuned in the absence of a sho\ving to
th(' contrar)~ that for the purposes of thi~ action, such
elaiu1s \verP Yali<1 clai111~ and that re~pondents \Vere the
O\Yners thereof.
~Che

la\\· is elear that a nnn1ng clai1n located upon
puhli<' land~ belonging to the lT nited State~ i~ property
to it~ fullP~t extent "Thieh 1nay be taxed, 1nortgaged,
tran~·d'prrerl, ~old and inherited. r~. ""')· r.-.:. }..~tchererry.
:!:·H) E.,. :!d 1 ~);-3 (lOth Ci r. 1D3(i) ; 30 l ~~('i~\_ :.!6. 30 l"'"~C~\_ :i;).
~Phe

general rule i~ stated at ;)() . A 111. J nr.. :\[ines
<tnrl l\Iinern1~. :~[):~. §103:
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""B~?

virtue of the Federal Statute (30 l?SC~-\
~()) a valid location, ,,·hether lode or placer,
~egregates the land einbraced fron1 the public
do1nain and operates as a grant by the United
States of the right of present and exclusive possession for such period as the locator rnay co1npl~·
\\·ith the E-,ederal la\Y~ and the local regulations
not inconsistent there,vith. 1t is apparent that
this right is as effective, for practical 1nining
purposes, as the fee passed by the patent, for
it inhibits an~,. further exploration of the pre1nises
and authorizes the locator to 1naintain his possession as against all other persons, including
the government. It is clear that the locator's
rights are not in any \ray dependent upon con-.
tinuous occupation of his claim, for it is settled
h:· an abundance of authority that actual possession is no ruore necessary for the protection
of the rights herein considered than for any
other rights granted hy the 1Jnited Rtates."
In the case ll. S. r. fl)thchererry, supra, \\?herein the
rights of a n1ining clai1nant's lessee to graze the surface
of the land as against the l . . nited States ,,,.ere discussed,
the court, although holding that general grazing right~
are not included \Yithin the po~se~~ory rights of a Inining clairn, clearly indicated those rights that \Yere ~n
included:
""\\~e are ~ati~fied that under the .~·tatute the
;n e r e location of a Jn in in rJ cl a·in 1 fJ i r r s to t h r l ocator only the rirJllt to e.rplore for alld n1ine
;n inerals, and to purcha~e the land if there has
been a co1nplianee \vith the provisions of tl1P
~tatute. As against third parties, the locator or
hi~ a~~igns have exrlu~ive right to use the surface
-of thi~ land, hut as against the l~nited Statrs,
hi~ right i~ conditional and inchoatP.
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The land is no !auger a JHtrt of the public
donlain so far as the nti~nerals are concerned, and
it is not oi)en to relocation until the rights of a
forrner locator have tern1inated.'' (Ernphasis supplied.)
The only atternpt rnade by appellant that could be
construed as an attack upon the validity of respondent~'
clairn~ \Ya~ a certain atternpted cro~~-exarnination of
respondent (;hournos during \Yhich the follo,ving colloquy took place ( Tr. 215-217) :

"Q.

X O"\Y these ruining elairns that-you and your
"~ife, is it, ~Ir. Chournos J? And one of your
farnily )? Three of you at least- I guess there
are four of you ?
6

. ._.\_.

Three farnilies. ~Ie and rny "\Yife, rny son and
his "\Yife, and l\Iilton Ornan and his \vife.

Q.

Yon \Yere parties in locating those rnining
clairn~. "\Yere you not J?

..._~.

Yes.

Q.

That "\Ya~ about \Yhen J? July. 1955 J? Is that
pretty close"?

_L\.

I think it "\Ya~ the spring of "53. or "'inter
of \):). Sorne tirne in there. "~hen \Y'e filed thern.

Q.

_.A._nd after you located thern yon didn •t do
any "\York on thern, did yon·?

~rR.

Ol\I.AK: I object to that as being totally
iunna terinl. l{e allege~ in hi~ cornplaint "\Ye're
the O"\YnPrs of the clain1~. "\Ye ans"\ver "\Ye are,
and therP i~ no i~~ue as to that.

~I

B. ().CONN"OI~:

~11\. O:i\f.AX:

It goe~ just to the Yalue.

It doe~n't go to the Yalue. It doesn·t
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111ake anY. differenee
done on then1 or not.

\\~hether

anv
.

\\~ork

\vas

'rHE l~O l ~l~T: I'n1 inclined to sustain that, as
far as this particular phase of the proceedings is concerned, Mr. O'Connor. I'll let you
exa1nine hiin at length any time you \Yant to,
before the Court only, on that subject.
~lit O'CON~OR:

All right. I'm not going to the
title. I'n1 going to the question of his idea of
the value. If he did an~~ \\Tork on theu1 or
not for three or four year~.

THJ-~~

COlTRT: What difference does it rnake
\v·hether he \vorks on it or not~ He located
the claim.

:\Ilt O'·CONNOR:

It goes to the value.

THE COlTI~T: Well, as far as this lawsuit is
concerned, the jury has got to consider that
these people own the clai1ns.
J~~ven

a~~tuning,

for the sake of argtunent only,
that had appellant been allo\ved to pursue this exarnination and in so doing sought to qne~tion the O\\"nership
of respondents, rather than the value fixed upon the
1naterial, and asstuning further that, for the purpose of
argtunent onJ~~, appellant n1ight lutYP sho\\·n failure to
perforn1 the necessary as~c>s~·nnent \York prior to appellant's entr~T' nevertheless, the la\v i~ \Yell settled that,
in the ahsence of a valid rPloeation, failure to perforrn
a.ssessrnent \York does not ipso facto terrninate the clairnants· rights. Icke.s u. 1-.-irginirt-C'Tolorado DrcelO]Jntent
Corp., :295 r~s 639, 35 S. Ct. 888, 79 L.Ed., 16:27.
It is subrnitted, therefore, that for the purpose of
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the instant action, under the la",.' the evidence and the
pleadings, the o"\vnership of the right to extract 1ninerals
front the area in question reposed in the respondents
and none other, and that upon affir1nance of the judgutent belo,v, respondents are entitled to in1n1ediate payInent therefor.

It is therefore subn1itted that the evidence presented
belo\\" to the court and jury is sufficient and eon1petent
to support the YPrdiets returned and that the verdicts
of the jury and the judgn1ents entered thereon should be
affir1ned. It is further subn1itted that the order of the
court belo"\v of X ove1nber 2, 1959 in Case X o. 819:2. perInitting appellant to n1ake pa~~11ent of the judgn1ent
entered therein to the clerk of the court to he held
pending detern1ina tion of the challenge of the linited
States to the Yalidity of the respondents• placer 1nining
elain1s should be vacated and set aside.
R.espertfully subn1itted.
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